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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on National Oil Company Efficiency, 
Energy Demand and Transportation 
by 
Stacy L. Eller 
This dissertation is composed of three separate essays in the field of energy 
economics. In the first paper, both data envelopment analysis and stochastic production 
frontier estimation are employed to provide empirical evidence on the revenue efficiency 
of national oil companies (NOCs) and private international oil companies (IOCs). Using 
a panel of 80 oil producing firms, the analysis suggests that NOCs are generally less 
efficient at generating revenue from a given resource base than IOCs, with some 
exceptions. Due to differing firm objectives, however, structural and institutional 
features may help explain much of the inefficiency. 
The second paper analyzes the relationship between economic development and 
the demand for energy. Energy consumption is modeled using panel data from 1990 to 
2004 for 50 countries spanning all levels of development. We find the relationship 
between energy consumption and economic development corresponds to the structure of 
aggregate output and the nature of derived demand for electricity and direct -use fuels in 
each sector. Notably, the evidence of non-constant income elasticity of demand is much 
greater for electricity demand than for direct-use fuel consumption. In addition, we show 
that during periods of rapid economic development, one in which the short-term growth 
iii 
rate exceeds the long-run average, an increase in aggregate output is met by less energy-
efficient capital. This is a result of capital being fixed in the short-term. As additional, 
more efficient capital stock is added to the production process, the short-term increase in 
energy intensity will diminish. 
In the third essay, we develop a system of equations to estimate a model of motor 
vehicle fuel consumption, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel efficiency for the 67 
counties of the State of Florida from 2001 to 2008. This procedure allows us to 
decompose the factors of fuel demand into elasticities of vehicle driving demand and fuel 
efficiency. Particular attention is paid to the influence of the price of fuel, the sale of 
goods and services, vehicle ownership and population density on each component of our 
model. 
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I. Essay 1 - Empirical Evidence on the Operational Efficiency of National Oil 
Companies! 
a. Introduction 
Countries that possess a national oil company (NOC) have held nearly 90% of 
global conventional crude oil reserves in every year since 1991, according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Agency (EIA, reporting data from Oil & Gas Journal). In addition, 
crude oil production in these countries increased from 50% of the global total in the mid-
1980s to remain near 66% since the mid-1990s. Moreover, private international oil 
companies (lOCs) have found it increasingly difficult to find or gain access to large oil 
and gas prospects, which could further increase NOC dominance of the global crude oil 
market. 
In a recent paper, Hartley and Medlock (2007) developed and analyzed a 
theoretical model of the operation and development of a National Oil Company (NOC). 
1 
They argued that the political overseers of a NOC are likely to require it to pursue various 
non-commercial objectives. Accordingly, a NOC is likely to favor excessive 
employment while under-investing in reserves and shifting resource extraction away from 
the future toward the present. A NOC also may be forced to sell oil products to domestic 
consumers at subsidized prices. Thus, NOCs will generally appear to be relatively 
inefficient, especially at generating revenue from given inputs of labor and reserves, 
when compared to private IOCs.2 If the analysis is correct, future global crude oil prices 
are likely to be higher than they would be if NOCs were less dominant. 
I This is a joint paper with Peter R. Hartley, and Kenneth B. Medlock III 
2 The word "inefficient" is used to mean getting less of a specified output from a given input bundle. The 
measures we calculate need not correspond to the economic notion of "efficiency" as Pareto optimality. In 
2 
In this paper, we apply both non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) and 
a parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to a sample of 80 firms over three years 
(2002 to 2004) to assess whether NOCs are indeed relatively revenue inefficient. We 
examine revenue efficiency not only because revenue is a key objective for both public 
and private firms, but also because political pressure is likely to force a NOC to sell 
products to domestic consumers at subsidized prices. Physical output measures would not 
necessarily capture the effect of such subsidies. 
A substantial body of evidence shows that state-owned firms generally are less 
efficiently managed than their private sector counterparts.3 Recent theoretical analyses of 
relative firm efficiency have focused on the principal-agent paradigm.4 Specifically, if 
managers (agents) seek to maximize their own utility rather than the objectives of the 
owners (principals) firm inefficiency can result. Theory and evidence suggest, however, 
that institutional features of private ownership help align managerial objectives with 
those of the owner. For example, tradable ownership shares give owners an incentive to 
monitor managerial performance and provide them with a readily observable measure of 
managerial performance. Furthermore, poor performance reduces the price of ownership 
shares, increasing the threat of takeover and decreasing the manager's job security. The 
threat of bankruptcy, which is generally absent for state-owned enterprises with 
government guaranteed debt, can also encourage managers to maintain cash flows. Such 
institutional features provide some degree of accountability and thus improve the 
particular, a NOC maximizing an objective function in which revenue is only one argument could be 
economically efficient. Nevertheless, the extent to which firms generate different amounts of revenue from 
a given vector of inputs can be used to judge whether their objectives truly differ as hypothesized. 
3 Villalonga (2000) provides a thorough discussion of theoretical and empirical studies of the efficiency of 
publicly versus privately owned firms, as well as the efficiency implications of privatization. 
4 The principal-agent paradigm was introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Harris and Raviv 
(1978). Property rights theory was originally developed by Alchian (1965). Other notable work on 
privatization includes Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Schmidt (1996). 
efficiency of private firms. Conversely, their absence in state-owned firms can help 
explain relative inefficiency. 
3 
More to the point, while the owners of a private firm all desire the managers to 
maximize the firm's market value, the political overseers of managers of state-owned 
enterprises generally have a less well-defined objective. Policies that engender excessive 
employment and subsidized consumer prices can increase political support. Regardless 
of their success in achieving a political objective, such policies hinder firm efficiency. 
There is an extensive literature on estimating productive efficiency. The two 
primary methods for computing production frontiers are data envelopment anal~sis and 
stochastic frontier analysis. In summary, DEA uses linear programming techniques to 
construct a non-parametric piecewise-linear convex hull of observed input-output 
bundles. In contrast, SFA involves estimating the production frontier from observed 
input-output bundles using econometric methods. By definition, the observed input-
output bundle of an efficient firm is on the production frontier, where as an inefficient 
firm is off the production frontier. 
Despite the importance of NOCs in the world oil market, we know of only one 
article, by AI-Obaidan and Scully (1991), that examines the relative efficiencies of 
NOC's using parametric techniques such as stochastic frontier analysis, and we could not 
find any studies using non-parametric data envelopment analysis. One potential 
explanation for a lack of substantial analysis of NOC efficiency is the paucity of data on 
non-publicly traded firms. Regardless of the reason, the AI-Obaidan and Scully paper is 
relatively novel in its application. 
Using data for 44 firms in a single year, 1981, AI-Obaidan and Scully construct a 
production frontier using deterministic and stochastic methods to examine the ability of 
firms to use assets and employees to produce output, where output was defined as either 
revenue earned or the quantity of crude oil produced plus the quantity of crude oil 
processed. Relative to private firms, the authors found that NOCs are only 63% to 65% 
as efficient in generating revenue. 
4 
Although our results are generally consistent with those of AI-Obaidan and 
Scully, our study differs in many respects. Most differences involve the data used in the 
analysis. For example, AI-Obaidan and Scully omit all OPEC nations, arguing that the 
demonstrated efficiency of those firms is "related more to the accident of geography than 
to the allocation of resources within the firm." In addition, they considered only vertically 
integrated firms, omitting firms specializing in the downstream or upstream sectors. In 
contrast, we omit only firms that specialize in the downstream sector.s Another key 
difference is that we use panel data in our analysis. 
Because the merits of the two very different approaches are often debated, we 
present results from both DEA and SF A to highlight the fact that evidence of NOC 
inefficiency is robust to the technique used to measure efficiency. Therefore, we are able 
to capitalize on the strengths, and guard against the weaknesses, of each method. In the 
following section, we describe DEA and SF A in greater detail. Section b summarizes the 
data we employ, while section c presents and discusses the basic results. Section d 
expands on section c by explaining the observed firm inefficiency relative to institution 
and structural features of specific firms. We follow with some concluding remarks. 
Estimating the Efficiency of NOCs 
5 We omitted such fIrms because we consider reserves as one of the inputs. 
5 
Koopmans (1951) defined a producer as technically efficient if and only if 
increasing production of one output results in either a reduction of some other output or 
an increase in some input. Debreu (1951) and Shephard (1953) suggested using distance 
functions to measure a firm's technical efficiency. Debreu's output-oriented measure 
requires a firm to maximize output for a given set of inputs, while in Shephard's input-
oriented definition a technically efficient firm minimizes the use of inputs for a given 
output. These measures are equivalent when the production technology exhibits constant 
returns to scale (CRS). 
Farrell (1957) was the first to measure technical efficiency by applying Debreu's 
measure to the U.S. agricultural sector. If a firm's observed output for a given level of 
inputs is best in practice, the firm is said to be on the frontier. In order to identify best 
practice, Farrell suggested constructing a piecewise-linear convex hull of observed input-
output bundles. Authors such as Boles (1966) used non-parametric mathematical 
programming, later termed data envelopment analysis (DEA) by Chames, Cooper, and 
Rhodes (1978), to identify such a piecewise-linear convex hull. 
More specifically, the output-oriented DEA technique calculates the proportion to 
which a firm maximizes output (physical units of production or monetary units of 
revenue or profit6) for a given level of inputs on a scale from zero to one. Specifically, 
suppose we have data for N firms each using K inputs and producing M outputs. Define 
X as the K x N matrix of inputs, Y as the M x N matrix of outputs, and let xn and Yn 
denote the inputs and outputs, respectively, of firm n. The CRS output-oriented technical 
efficiency of each firm is then calculated by solving the following linear program: 
6 We will focus on revenue efficiency by specifying the fIrm's output to be revenue. 
6 
max,J,(JO 
-Oy +YA~O 
(1-1) 
subject to: 
n 
x -XA~O 
n 
A~O 
where 1 $ 0 $ 00 is a scalar and A is an N x 1 vector of constants. The technical 
efficiency score is then defined as 0-1•7 
Farrell's research in productive efficiency also influenced the development of 
stochastic frontier analysis, the other method employed in this paper to estimate firm-
specific measures of revenue efficiency. Stochastic frontier analysis was introduced 
simultaneously by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977).8 Unlike the DEA approach, stochastic frontier analysis requires various 
parametric assumptions. The SF A approach identifies inefficiency as part of a two-
component error, where one component captures statistical noise and the other captures 
inefficiency. 
Specifically, consider a single output production function for a cross-section of N 
firms with Kinputs to be given as Yn = !(x1,n, ... ,xK,n>. If we assume the production 
technology can be represented as Cobb-Douglas, then we can linearize the production 
function by taking the natural logarithm, yielding 
K 
In Yn = a+ IPk lnxk,n +Vn -un 
k=1 
(1-2) 
7 Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extended the CRS DEA model to allow variable returns to scale 
(VRS). Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1999) provide a thorough discussion of DE A for both CRS and VRS. 
8 Prior to the development of the stochastic frontier approach, authors such as Aigner and Chu (1968) and 
Afriat (1972) estimated a deterministic production frontier from a cross-section of firms. The resulting 
one-sided, nonnegative residual from that method captures each fum's inefficiency. Such a deterministic 
approach, however, does not allow random factors, such as unusual weather, to influence output. 
7 
where vn is a stochastic component generally assumed to be normally distributed and u 
n 
captures the nonnegative technical efficiency component. Define en as the composed 
error such that en = vn - un. londrow et al. (1982) proposed estimating individual 
technical efficiency from the expected value of u conditional on e using maximum 
n n 
likelihood. Firm-specific efficiency can then be calculated as e-E(u. i£.). Since un ~ 0, 
efficiency will be bounded between zero and one. 
Kumbhakar (1987) and Battese and Coelli (1988) proposed a panel data extension 
to this maximum likelihood approach to estimate firm-specific technical efficiency.9 The 
log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for panel data is 
K 
In Yn,t = a+ IPk lnxk,n,t +Vn,t -un 
k=! 
where it is assumed the technical efficiency is time-invariant. lo Estimation of this 
production function using maximum likelihood requires the following distributional 
assumptions on the error components, v n t and u : 
, n 
(1-3) 
(ii) un - N+ (J.l, au 2) where N+ denotes the truncated-normal distribution, and 
(iii) v t and u are distributed independently of each other and the regressors. 
n, n 
9 Schmidt and Sickles (1984) also proposed using one-sided fixed-effects and random-effects to measure 
time-invariant producer-specific technical efficiency. See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for a thorough 
survey of panel stochastic frontier analysis. 
10 The time-invariant specification of the panel frontier estimation was chosen because our panel contains 
observations for only three years, 2002 through 2004. The time-varying specifications following Cornwell, 
Schmidt and Sickles (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992), for example, are generally used for longer 
panels in which the focus of the research is to measure efficiency change over some period such as 
deregulation or privatization. 
8 
Given these distributional assumptions on the composed error, defined as 
Cn,t = V n,t - un ' the log likelihood function for a sample of N producers over T time periods 
IS 
(1-4) 
where q, ( .) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 
2 T- 2 2 2 
- f.1av - cau -2 au a v d - 1 L f.1= a= an c=- C 
n a 2+Ta 2 ' a2+Ta2' T n,t· 
v u v u t 
This log likelihood function can be maximized to obtain parameter estimates. 
Furthermore, time invariant firm-specific estimates of technical efficiency can be 
recovered from the expected value of un conditional on Cn,t. This is given by 
(1-5) 
where ¢(.) and q,(.) are the standard normal density function and cumulative 
distribution function, respectively. The firm-specific technical efficiency score for firm n 
is equal to e -E(Un!Cn,l) , which is bounded between zero and one. 
Both DEA and SFA have been used extensively to analyze productive efficiency. 
Comparison of methods is available in Gong and Sickles (1992), Banker (1993), Cooper 
and Tone (1997), and Ruggiero (2007), to name a few. However, we explore both 
approaches to highlight the fact that evidence of NOC inefficiency is robust to the 
approach used, rather than to compare methods for measuring efficiency. 
The advantage of using the DEA approach is that it requires no assumptions 
regarding the functional form of the production technology and is not subject to the 
potential problems of assuming an inappropriate distribution of the error term. In this 
sense, the non-parametric DEA approach is more robust than the stochastic frontier 
method. However, since DEA does not account for statistical noise, estimates of 
efficiency will be biased when stochastic elements are a prominent feature of the true 
production process or the variables used in the analysis are measured with error. 
The stochastic frontier approach, however, more directly shows how various 
factors influence firm behavior. It also allows more types of variables to be included in 
the analysis and provides a statistical measure of how well the proposed model explains 
the data. A potential weakness, however, is that one has to specify a structural 
relationship between inputs and outputs, including how stochastic terms arise. If these 
auxiliary assumptions are inaccurate, the resulting inferences about the underlying model 
may be compromised. 
b. Data 
We focus on the efficiency in generating revenue from inputs of employees, oil 
reserves, and natural gas reserves for 80 firms worldwide, including 10 of OPEC's 12 
member nations. 11 Since OPEC's role in the international oil markets cannot be 
11 OPEC increased to 12 members when Angola officially joined in 2007. Although Angola is included in 
the study, Iraq is omitted due to ongoing domestic and petroleum industry turmoil and Libya due to a lack 
of relevant data. 
9 
10 
overstated, the inclusion of these firms is important when estimating efficiency in the 
petroleum industry. 
As noted in the introduction, we use revenue as a measure of output because, 
unlike output measured as a physical quantity, this allows us to capture the effects of 
forcing NOCs to subsidize domestic energy prices. In addition, we want a scalar measure 
of output for the stochastic frontier analysis and it is natural to aggregate different 
products using their relative market prices. The techniques used to measure technical 
efficiency can be directly applied to revenue efficiency. The interpretation, however, is 
slightly different because revenue efficiency requires a firm to be both technically 
efficient and to produce the appropriate mix of outputs given market prices. 12 
We use oil and gas reserves (measured separately) and total employment as inputs 
to revenue production. In contrast to Al-Obaidan and Scully, we do not include total 
assets as an input, primarily because data on total assets is not available for many NOCs, 
especially members of OPEC. By using total reserves as a measure of accumulated 
investment, we increase our sample by eight highly influential NOCs. Furthermore, 
reserves are likely to be a substantial part of total assets of most oil and gas firms, and are 
likely to be measured much more accurately than other assets. 13 
By ignoring non-reserve assets, however, we may be introducing another bias. 
Vertically integrated firms engaged in both upstream (exploration and production) and 
12 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide a detailed discussion of revenue, profit, and cost efficiency. 
13 For many oil and gas firms, reserves are audited and valued at market prices. By contrast, the remaining 
assets are valued at their book (or accounting) value rather than their economic value. Cumulative 
depreciation of non-reserves assets is an accounting measure correlated with the purchase price and age of 
the assets, but not necessarily with their productive capability. The accounting measure of asset value is 
also seriously distorted by inflation, which is important for many of the countries in our sample. Thus, the 
book value of total assets may be either over or understated relative to their economic value as an input to 
production. Consequently, using asset book value would impact the estimation of revenue efficiency in a 
way that would be difficult to interpret. 
11 
downstream (refining) operations will record revenue from the sale of refined products in 
addition to the external sale of crude to other parties. Since we are not measuring capital 
employed in refining, transporting and marketing operations as inputs, however, a 
vertically integrated firm would appear to be more efficient than other firms in generating 
revenue using the same reserves and employees. 
The data were collected from the Energy Intelligence annual publication 
"Ranking the World's Oil Companies". Where available, company annual reports were 
used to verify the published data and to provide missing data. After eliminating firms 
specialized in downstream activities and thus lacking reserves, and firms for which other 
relevant data is unavailable, our sample was reduced from 100 to 80 firms (78 with 
complete information). Table 1-1 lists the 80 firms in the study along with the countries 
in which their head offices are located, their shares of government ownership, and some 
statistics on revenue per employee and revenue per unit of reserves for 2004. 14 
We have also included in the table averages of revenue per employee and revenue 
per unit of reserves for different categories of firms. These indicate that the major 
international oil companies (BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, and Shell 
collectively denoted major laCs) fall near the top of all the firms in the sample in both of 
the revenue per unit of input measures. In addition, although NOCs can be found 
throughout the range, on average they are toward the bottom of the table and dominate 
the bottom 20% in both measures. 
14 For this table, reserves are defined as the sum of crude oil reserves and natural gas reserves on a barrel of 
oil equivalent (boe) basis. 
12 
Table 1-1: Companies with selected statistics for 2004 
Revenue per Revenue per Government 
Company Employee Reserves Ownership Country 
$1,OOOlemp..z0yee $/boe % 
NOCs 
Adnoc 205 0.20 100% UAE 
CNOOC 2,656 2.97 71% China 
Ecopetrol 824 2.26 100% Colombia 
Eni 1,056 10.50 30% Italy 
Gazprom 103 0.l6 51% Russia 
INA 187 11.70 75% Croatia 
KMG 200 1.27 100% Kazakhstan 
KPC 1,650 0.34 100% Kuwait 
MOL 635 42.37 25% Hungary 
NIOC 283 0.11 100% Iran 
NNPC 1,460 0.56 100% Nigeria 
NorskHydro 673 11.37 44% Norway 
OMV 2,214 8.90 32% Austria 
ONGC 298 2.11 84% India 
PD~ 1,591 0.98 60% Oman 
PDVSA 1,985 0.66 100% Venezuela 
Pemex 506 4.01 100% Mexico 
Pertamina 453 0.73 100% Indonesia 
Petrobras 773 3.39 32% Brazil 
Petro China III 2.52 90% China 
Petroecuador 1,026 1.51 100% Ecuador 
Petronas 1,202 1.45 100% Malaysia 
PTT 2,896 16.68 100% Thailand 
QP 1,800 0.10 100% Qatar 
Rosneft 86 0.19 100% Russia 
Saudi Aramco 2,261 0.40 100% Saudi Arabia 
Sinopec 192 19.76 57% China 
Socar 53 0.74 100% Azerbaijan 
Sonangol 755 1.37 100% Angola 
Sonatrach 688 0.93 100% Algeria 
SPC 375 1.71 100% Syriac 
Statoil 1,910 10.85 71% Norway 
TPAO 154 1.53 100% Turke~ 
Average 947.31 4.98 
Major JOCs 
BP 2,788 15.68 0% UK 
Chevron 2,606 12.78 0% US 
ConocoPhillips 3,368 14.03 0% US 
Exxon Mobil 3,148 12.26 0% US 
Shell 2,418 21.67 0% Netherlands 
Average 2,865.48 15.28 
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Revenue per Revenue per Government 
Company Employee Reserves Ownership Country 
$1,OOOlemp.ioy"ee $lboe % 
Others 
Amerada Hess 16.07 0% US 
Anadarko 1,838 2.52 0% US 
Apache 2,019 2.71 0% US 
BG 1,547 3.64 0% UK 
Burlington 2,537 2.74 0% US 
Chesapeake Energy 1,577 3.22 0% US 
CNR 4,606 3.85 0% Canada 
Devon 2,356 4.33 0% US 
Dominion 847 13.81 0% US 
EnCana 2,915 4.48 0% Canada 
EOG 1,844 2.38 0% US 
Forest Oil 1,841 4.02 0% US 
Husky Energy 2,149 9.53 0% Canada 
Imperial 2,838 17.91 0% Canada 
Kerr-McGee 1,263 4.15 0% US 
Lukoil 233 1.68 0% Russia 
Maersk 60 2.90 0% Denmark 
Marathon 1,757 39.14 0% US 
Murphy 1,436 21.60 0% US 
Newfield 2,114 4.45 0% US 
Nexen 1,048 4.25 0% Canada 
Nippon Oil 2,690 131.74 0% Japan 
Noble 2,433 2.54 0% US 
Novatek 220 0.21 0% Russia 
Occidental 1,577 4.46 0% US 
Penn West 1,577 2.53 0% Canada 
Petro-Canada 2,370 9.24 0% Canada 
Petro Kazakhstan 546 4.12 0% Kazakhstan 
Pioneer 1,183 1.76 0% US 
Pogo 5,088 4.38 0% US 
Repsol YPF 1,561 10.79 0% Spain 
Santos 789 1.92 0% Australia 
Sibneft 189 1.81 0% Russia 
Suncor 1,447 13.41 0% Canada 
Surgutneftegas 121 1.01 0% Russia 
Talisman 2,207 3.26 0% Canada 
TNK 63 1.66 0% Russia 
Total 1,406 14.33 0% France 
Unocal 1,259 4.63 0% US 
Vintage 1,136 1.76 0% US 
Woodside 758 2.11 0% Australia 
XTO 1,437 1.94 0% US 
Averas:e 1,628.94 9.26 
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While the data in Table 1-1 reveal that large firms with publicly held shares tend 
to have the highest revenue per unit of input measures, this may not mean they are more 
efficient. For example, these companies may be more vertically integrated than the 
remaining firms. The subsequent formal analysis will control for vertical integration by 
including a measure of petroleum product sales divided by total liquids production. 15 
The data suggest that a higher degree of government ownership may reduce 
efficiency in producing revenue from employees and reserves. For example, a 
government may force its NOC to subsidize domestic prices of oil products (a practice 
sometimes referred to as two-tiered pricing). In the formal analysis, we use information 
on the domestic retail prices of gasoline and diesel fuel to define a two-tiered pricing 
variable. While it is a rough approximation, we assume that every country with an 
average price below that of the United States has two-tier pricing. 16 
c. Analysis and Results 
To begin, we used output-oriented DEA assuming CRS to calculate the firm-
specific revenue efficiency measures using the observed input-revenue bundles for each 
year. l ? Employees, oil reserves (in million barrels), and natural gas reserves (in billion 
cubic feet) are included as separate inputs for the generation of revenue (in million U.S. 
15 This definition of vertical integration is consistent with the inverse of the integration ratio used by Al-
Obaidan and Scully. Specifically, the authors define the integration ratio as barrels of oil produced divided 
by barrels oil processed. The implication of vertical integration, however, is the same. 
16 Metschies (2003) and Metschies (2005) provide a survey of international fuel prices for 2002 and 2004, 
respecitively. Following Metschies' definition of fuel subsidization, we assume that any country in which 
the simple average price of diesel and gasoline for 2002 and 2004 is below that of the U.S. subsidizes fuel 
prices. 
17 Calculations were performed using Coelli's software program DEAP Version 2. J. As the DEA model 
becomes more complex through the addition of structural and institutional variables in the following 
section, the efficiency scores for CRS converge to those of VRS. This suggests that the underlying 
technology truly exhibits CRS. Since all results and conclusions are identical for VRS, we report only CRS 
for simplicity. 
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dollars) for 78 firms from 2002 through 2004. 18 The average revenue efficiency score for 
each firm across the three years is graphed in the horizontal dimension in Figure 1. 19 To 
summarize, the IOCs are clustered near the frontier (right boundary), while the NOCs, 
although dispersed throughout, tend to be clustered near the left boundary. The average 
revenue efficiency measure using DEA for the NOCs is about 0.28 compared to 0.73 for 
the five major IOCs and 0.45 for other firms. 
A second set of revenue efficiency measures was obtained using maximum 
likelihood to estimate a stochastic frontier for the 80 firms in our sample. We estimate a 
fairly simple model in which, as in the DEA approach, revenue is produced using oil 
reserves, natural gas reserves and employees as inputs. Time effects are included because 
the prevailing market prices of oil and gas, which are not constant across years, will 
affect the revenue generated in each year. Time effects were unnecessary in the DEA 
approach because separate revenue efficiency measures are calculated for each year. The 
equation estimated using the stochastic frontier approach is given as (standard errors in 
parentheses ): 
InRev t =4.9421+0.3786*lnL t +0.1203*lnOilRsvnt +0.1888*lnNGRsvnt 
n, (0.5960) (0.0638) n, (0.0612) '(0.0551) , 
+ 0.2706* t2oo3 + 0.4416* t2oo4 + vn t -un (0.0247) (0.0250) , 
(1-6) 
Each of the coefficients has the expected sign and is significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level. 20 
18 We are limited to 78 fIrms here because two fIrms have an incomplete time series of data. Since we 
report average revenue effIciency scores for each year for DEA, using only the available data may be 
misleading. Thus we chose to drop these two firms, Socar and SPC. 
19 Averaging frrm-specifIc effIciency over time using DEA is consistent with Gong and Sickles (1992), who 
use Monte Carlo techniques and panel data to compare stochastic frontier analysis and DEA. 
20 To compute frrm-specifIc effIciency for panel data, DEA calculates a production frontier for each year 
which allows technology to change from one year to the next. In contrast, time-invariant stochastic frontier 
analysis with time effects, allows the intercept to shift from year to year, but the marginal productivity of 
inputs is assumed to be constant. Therefore, we test the assumption that the data can be pooled across time. 
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To determine whether revenue inefficiency does indeed exist in our sample, we 
test if r = U u /( Uu + uv ) is greater than zero. For this simple stochastic frontier model, r 
is equal to 0.9593. Not only do we reject that r is statistically greater than zero, r is 
statistically greater than 0.5 which indicates that the composed error is dominated by the 
inefficiency term.21 
As noted previously, the revenue efficiencies of firms as estimated in the 
stochastic frontier regression are given by e -E(Un1en.,). Figure 1-1 plots the resulting 
efficiencies in the vertical dimension for the 78 firms in our sample with complete data. 
Once again, we find the five major IOCs clustered near the frontier (upper boundary). 
Moreover, the NOCs, while dispersed, tend to be grouped near the lower boundary. 
Since the dominant tendency in Figure 1-1 is for the observations to fall on a diagonal 
from the bottom left to the top right of the figure, the two efficiency measures are 
obviously positively correlated. The Spearman rank order correlation between the DEA 
and stochastic frontier efficiency measures is 0.6974 and a test of the null hypothesis that 
the two orderings are independent is rejected at a p-value less than 0.0001. 
Similarly, a regression of the stochastic frontier efficiency measure on the DEA 
measure yields (standard error in parentheses), with an R2 = 0.395 , 
RevEffSj n = -0.0011+ 0.4264* RevEffDEA n • 
, (0.0282) (0.0606) , 
(1-7) 
The dependent variable remains the natural logarithm of revenue and the independent variables are time 
effects and the natural logarithm of employees, oil reserves, and natural gas reserves for each year 
separately. The hypothesis is that the coefficients on the three inputs are equal across the three time 
periods. For each set of inputs, a test of this hypothesis can not be rejected at even the 10% level. Thus 
we proceed with the assumption that the data is poolable. 
21 r is computed and tested for each of the subsequent stochastic frontier models we estimate, and we find 
similar results. Table 2 reports r for each of these models. 
Figure 1-1: DEA (average) and stochastic frontier revenue efficiency measure 
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The fact that two techniques using very different approaches yield similar results 
should increase confidence that the results reflect genuine underlying differences between 
the finns.22 In particular, both measures clearly show that the major laCs are the most 
revenue efficient, while the NOCs tend to be among the least efficient at raising revenue 
from inputs of reserves and employees. 
22 An intriguing feature of Figure 1 is that the "outliers" to the regression relationship between the two 
efficiency measures tend to have a DEA score above their stochastic frontier score. A possible explanation 
could be that the assumed functional form for the stochastic frontier is inappropriate for these firms. 
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d. Explaining Inefficiency 
Many factors can influence the relative rankings of such a wide variety of firms, 
especially when the generation of revenue is the only measured objective. For instance, a 
NOC with non-commercial goals might be expected to be off the revenue frontier when 
compared to a firm with no such objectives. In addition, as noted above, different 
degrees of vertical integration could also affect measured revenue efficiency. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we allowed additional variables, such as vertical 
integration and share of government ownership to influence the frontier using data 
envelopment analysis. Model 1 in Table 1-2 summarizes the average revenue efficiency 
measures from the basic DEA model presented in the previous section. Model 2 adds 
vertical integration (defined as petroleum product sales divided by total liquids 
production) as an input, while Model 3 adds both vertical integration and share of non-
government ownership. 23 The results show that the measured revenue efficiency of each 
firm in Model 1 can to a large extent be explained by these included structural and 
institutional variables. 
Table 1-2: Summary of firm revenue efficiency, average data envelopment analysis 
AU firms NOC MajorIOC Others 
Modell 0.394 0.276 0.728 0.449 
Model 2 0.622 0.441 0.980 0.726 
Model 3 0.768 0.754 0.981 0.754 
Including the vertical integration variable in Model 2 corrects for a measurement 
issue introduced by the manner in which we have defined inputs and outputs, as 
23 Unlike SFA, DEA requires all inputs to have a positive impact on production. Non-government 
ownership is simply one minus the share of government ownership. 
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discussed above. A noteworthy result is that accounting for vertical integration moves 
the five major IOCs toward the frontier. Thus, the data indicates that the corporate 
structure of a firm is an important feature in the production of revenue. 
Adding the non-government ownership share in Model 3 reveals that variable as 
being responsible for a large amount of the measured revenue inefficiencies that remain 
in Model 2, particularly for the NOCs. Thus, the DEA analysis confirms the result that 
government ownership reduces the ability of a firm to produce revenues for a given 
quantity of inputs. 
Although the DEA approach suggests that relative firm efficiency is hindered by 
government ownership, we employ stochastic frontier approach because it allows us to 
test the statistical significance of specific characteristics which may impact the ability of 
a firm to generate revenue. Vertical integration and government ownership share are 
structural and institutional features that may affect the firm's ability to transform 
employees and reserves into revenue. Two-tiered pricing also impairs the firm's ability 
to generate revenue by forcing it to sell some output at subsidized prices.24 One could 
view these variables as explaining some of the measured inefficiency, un. SF A, therefore, 
allows us to identify the objectives of the NOC that may not be consistent with a purely 
profit maximizing firm. 
For convenience, we shall refer to the basic stochastic frontier model estimated in 
the previous section as Model 1 sf. Departing from Modellsf, we systematically add the 
variables discussed above to determine whether they can explain the estimated deviations 
from the frontier. For example, Model 2sf adds a measure of vertical integration as an 
24 Other factors may matter in individual cases, but the point of this exercise is to focus on measurable 
systematic influences on revenue efficiency and more specifically to investigate whether there are any 
systematic differences between NOC's and other firms. 
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input. Model 3sf then adds measures of both government share and vertical integration. 
Following the conclusions of the model developed by Hartley and Medlock (2007), 
Model 4sf then adds a dummy variable (2TierP) for those countries that subsidize 
domestic prices and an interaction term between the share of government ownership and 
total employment. Table 1-3 presents the estimation results for each of the various 
stochastic revenue frontier models.25 
Model 2sf shows that vertical integration is significant in explaining why firms 
are estimated to be inefficient in generating revenue. The positive coefficient on the 
vertical integration variable indicates that vertical integration enhances a firm's ability to 
generate revenue. Prior to controlling for vertical integration, firms with large 
investments in downstream activities will tend to have a less negative un and thus will 
appear more efficient at generating revenue. As noted above, this is due to the fact that 
we are not accounting for capital inputs used in refining and marketing operations to 
produce higher valued products. For example, when we move to Model 2sf, Nippon Oil, 
which is heavily integrated in downstream activities, actually moves away from the 
estimated frontier. 
The negative coefficient on the government share variable in Model 3sf indicates, 
as hypothesized at the outset, that government ownership tends to reduce a firm's ability 
to produce revenue from given inputs. This coefficient summarizes the overall effect of 
25 We also test the hypothesis of poolablility for Model 4sf (see footnote 24). The hypothesis that the 
coefficient for each input is constant across the three years can only be rejected for vertical integration at 
the 5% level, but not the 2.5% level. However, this result seems to be driven by increased product sales in 
2003 for the two most vertically integrated firms in our sample, Nippon Oil and PTT. Upon dropping these 
firms, the hypothesis cannot be rejected for any input at the 5% significance level. 
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government ownership,z6 The remaining model in Table 1-3 adds new variables to the set 
of inputs to help us understand the source of this overall negative effect. 
Table 1-3: Panel estimation of stochastic frontier 
Modellsf Model2sf Model3sf Model4sf 
InL 0.3786*** 0.3761 *** 0.4300*** 0.5600*** 0.0638 0.0649 0.0924 0.0313 
InOilRsv 0.1203** 0.1795*** 0.1801 *** 0.2438*** 0.0612 0.0559 0.0656 0.0414 
InNGRsv 0.1888*** 0.1758*** 0.2101 *** 0.1567*** 0.0551 0.0566 0.0787 0.0359 
Vertlnt 0.0903*** 0.0868*** 0.1071 *** 0.0254 0.0286 0.0161 
GovShare -0.5254*** 2.7658*** 0.1499 0.6016 
2TierP -0.9644*** 0.1260 
GovShare * In L 
-0.2821 *** 
0.0590 
year 2003 0.2705*** 0.2648*** 0.2647*** 0.2604*** 
0.0247 0.0253 0.0257 0.0262 
year 2004 0.4416*** 0.4400*** 0.4295*** 0.4331 *** 
0.0250 0.0255 0.0261 0.0263 
constant 4.9421 *** 4.0124*** 3.0038** 1.3993*** 0.5960 0.8202 1.2613 0.2297 
r 0.9734 0.9678 0.9698 0.9840 
95% Conf. 0.9593 to 0.9473 to 0.9204 to 0.9289 to 
Interval of r 0.9826 0.9805 0.9889 0.9966 
Z2(d) 519.63 497.40 562.74 2664.44 
d 5 6 7 9 
Log Likelihood -78.10 -70.90 -66.14 -41.93 
# Observations 237 237 237 237 
Model 4sf includes a dummy variable for companies headquartered in countries 
where domestic prices are subsidized.27 This enables us to capture the effect of a lower 
26 We also examined the case in which GovShare was allowed to differ for importing and exporting fIrms. 
The coeffIcients were not statistically different from each other or the GovShare variable in Model 3sf. 
27 Countries for which the 2-tiered pricing dummy was positive are Colombia, Mexico, Russia, China, 
Thailand, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Syria, Oman, UAE, Kuwait, 
Algeria, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela. 
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average sales price for firms likely to be selling a significant amount of output at 
subsidized domestic oil prices. As discussed above, such subsidies might be imposed to 
gamer political support from a broad constituency. The negative, and highly significant, 
coefficient on this two-tier pricing variable indicates that subsidized domestic prices do 
adversely affect the firm's ability to produce revenues.28 
Government ownership can also lead to excessive employment in a NOC as 
another way of redistributing resource rents. Model4sf therefore also includes an 
interaction term between employment and government share.29 The estimated coefficient 
is strongly negative and highly statistically significant. In addition, the three physical 
variable inputs have a strong and statistically significant positive effect on the production 
of revenue, while the influence of the vertical integration is not significantly different 
than Model 3sf.30 
Model 4sf confirms that government ownership tends to result in a larger 
workforce than necessary to meet purely commercial objectives. This follows from the 
coefficients on government share and the interaction term. In particular, if government 
share is zero, then these variables drop out of the equation. However, the combined 
effect of government share and the interaction term can be written 
28 Although 2003 fuel prices are not available from Metschies, we test the appropriateness of using the 2-
tiered pricing dummy to capture the impact of price subsidies using data for 2002 and 2004. The 2-tier 
pricing variable is replaced with the level of subsidy (if positive). None the coefficients is statistically 
different from those of Model4sf. However, the coefficient on GovShare becomes insignificant. 
29 We also examined the interaction between GovShare and reserves of oil and natural gas reserves. We 
found these interaction terms to be insignificant. This is consistent with the theoretical model presented in 
Hartley and Medlock (2007), which predicts ambiguous effects of government ownership on the level of 
reserves, conditional on the age of the resource. 
30 Model 4sf fits the data reasonably well in terms of its ability to recreate observed firm revenues. 
However, there are three points, corresponding to the firms SPC and Socar, which are outliers with regard 
to goodness of fit. These two companies also happen to be the firms for which the data does not cover all 
three years, while the data that is included appears to be "rounded off'. Thus, the fact that the model does 
not fit these firms very well is likely related to insufficiency of the data set. 
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GovShare*(2.7658-0.2821 *lnL), 
which is generally negative for firms with a positive government share. 31 The negative 
coefficient on the interaction term can also be interpreted as implying increased 
employment has a diminishing positive effect on revenue (that is, has a lower marginal 
revenue product) the higher is the government share in ownership.32 
An interesting regularity in Model 4sf is that the Russian firms (regardless of the 
amount of government ownership) tend to be ranked with low levels of revenue 
efficiency. This suggests that systematic features of doing business in Russia apart from 
government ownership negatively affect the ability of Russian firms to generate revenue 
from a given level of reserves and employment.33 
Table 1-4 summarizes the revenue efficiency scores for the four stochastic frontier 
models. Adding vertical integration moved firms closer to the frontier, especially for the 
major international oil companies. The national oil companies, however, moved toward 
the frontier with the introduction of the government share variable in Model 3sf. 
Furthermore, the general tendency is that revenue tends to decrease with an 
increase in the exercise of government controls. For example, if a firm is forced to sell 
into a subsidized market, its revenues are impacted negatively. In addition, although an 
31 Among all firms with a positive government share in 2004, only two are not subject to two-tier pricing 
and thus the overall impact of government ownership may be positive. OMV (with 5748 employees and 
25% government ownership in 2004) and TPAO (with 5184 employees and 100% government ownership 
in 2004) have positive coefficients of 0.0810 and 0.3238, respectively. These are statistically positive at 
the 5% level, but not the 2.5% level. 
32 Following Schmidt and Sickles (1984), we also estimate the random effects stochastic frontier model. 
The results are consistent with the implications of the four stochastic frontier models using MLE. In 
particular, the signs are the same and each coefficient is significant at the 1 % level in all four models. The 
fixed effects approach is inappropriate, however, because our analysis contains time-invariant regressors. 
33 To guard against the possibility that the Russian firms are affecting the remaining coefficient estimates, 
we examined the effect of including a dummy variable for Russian companies in Model 4sf. It had a 
coefficient of -1.263 and standard error of 0.170. Including this variable did not, however, significantly 
affect any of the remaining coefficients. 
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increase in the number of employees tends to increase revenues, firms with full 
government ownership will generate less revenue for a given level of employment. The 
largest three firms - Petro China, Sinopec, and Gazprom - are each fully owned by the 
government and domestic prices are subsidized. Therefore, the fact that the NOCs move 
toward the frontier in Model 4sf indicates that these objectives are significant to national 
oil companies. 
• 
Table 1-4: Summary of firm revenue efficiency, stochastic frontier analysis 
All firms NOC MajorIOC Others 
Modellsf 0.168 0.128 0.600 0.148 
Model2sf 0.253 0.197 0.805 0.233 
Model3sf 0.351 0.329 0.843 0.443 
Mode14sf 0.567 0.538 0.893 0.551 
e. Concluding remarks 
The evidence provided in this paper, using both non-parametric and parametric 
techniques, supports the notion that non-commercial government objectives can 
negatively affect the ability of a NOC to earn revenue. In particular, we have uncovered 
evidence that the government overseers of such firms tend to redistribute resource rents 
toward domestic consumers of oil products and domestic employees of the firm. Such 
pressures can alter the investment patterns of the NOC and result in an outcome that can 
be described as operationally inefficient. 
We conclude that the relative revenue inefficiencies of various NOC's, which are 
observed when one considers only commercial objectives, are largely the result of 
governments exercising control over the distribution of rents. This is an important 
25 
finding. If an increasing proportion of global oil and gas resources are under the control 
of NOC' s, it is reasonable to expect that an increasing majority of oil and gas 
developments will be undertaken with political objectives in mind. This will result in 
inefficiencies in the production of revenues, and possibly lower levels of production and 
higher prices, than would occur under commercial development. 
f. References 
Afriat, S.N. (1972). "Efficiency Estimation of Production Functions," International 
Economic Review, 13: 568-598. 
Aigner, D.J. and S.P. Chu (1968). "On Estimating the Industry Production Function," 
American Economic Review, 58(4): 826-839. 
Aigner, D.J., c.A.K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt (1977). "Formulation and Estimation of 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models," Journal of Econometrics, 6(1): 
21-37. 
Alchian, A.A. (1965). "Some Economics of Property Rights," Il Politico, 30(4): 816-
829. 
AI-Obaidan, A.M. and G.W. Scully (1991). "Efficiency Differences between Private and 
State-owned Enterprises in the International Petroleum Industry," Applied 
Economics, 23: 237-246. 
Banker, R.D., A. Charnes, and W.W. Cooper (1984). "Some Models for Estimating 
Technical and Scale Inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis," Management 
Science, 30(9): 1078-1092. 
Banker, R.D. (1993). "Maximum Likelihood, Consistency and Data Envelopment 
Analysis: A Statistical Foundation," Management Science, 39(10): 1256-1273. 
Battese, G.E., and T.J. Coelli (1988). "Prediction of Firm-Level Technical Efficiencies 
with a Generalized Frontier Production Function and Panel Data," Journal of 
Econometrics, 38(3): 387-399. 
Battese, G.E., and T.J. Coelli (1992). "Frontier Production Functions, Technical 
Efficiency and Panel Data: With Application to Paddy Farms in India," Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, 3(1-2): 153-169. 
26 
Boardman, AE. and AR. Vining (1989). "Ownership and Performance in Competitive 
Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-
Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, 32(1): 1-33. 
Boles, J.N. (1966). "Efficiencr Squared - Efficient Computation of Efficiency Indexes," 
Proceedings of the 39t Annual Meeting of the Western Farm Economic 
Association, 137-142. 
Charnes, A, W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes (1978). "Measuring the Efficiency of Decision 
Making Units," European Journal of Operations Research, 2: 429-444. 
Coelli, TJ. (1996). "A Guide to DEAP Version 2.1: A Data Envelopment Analysis 
(Computer) Program", CEPA Working Paper 96/8, Department of Econometrics, 
University of New England, Armidale NSW Australia. 
Coelli, T., D.S.P. Rao, and G.E. Battese (1999). An Introduction to Efficiciency and 
Productive Analysis. Boston: Kluw3er Academic Publishers. 
Cooper, W.W. and K. Tone (1997). "Measures of Inefficiency in Data Envelopment 
Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Estimation," European Journal of Operational 
Research, 99(1): 72-88. 
Cornwell, C., P. Schmidt, and R.c. Sickles (1990). "Production Froniters with Cross-
Sectional and Time-Series Variation in Efficiency Levels," Journal of 
Econometrics,46(1-2): 185-200. 
Cote, D. (1984). "Firm Efficiency and Ownership Structure: The Case of the U.S. 
Electric Utilities Using Panel Data," Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 60: 431-450. 
Debreu, G. (1951). "The Coefficient of Resource Utilization," Econometrica, 19(3): 273-
292. 
Green, W.H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. 5th ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Energy Intelligence (2004,2005,2006) The Energy Intelligence Top 100: Ranking the 
World's Oil Companies. 
Energy Information Administration (2004, 2006). International Energy Annual, "Table 
2.2 World Crude Oil Production, 1980-2004". 
Energy Information Administration (2007). "World Proved Crude Oil Reserves, January 
1, 1980- January 1,2007 Estimates". 
Farrell, M.J. (1957). "The Measurement of Productive Efficiency", Journal of Royal 
Statistical Society, 120(3): 11-48. 
27 
Gong, B.H. and R.C. Sickles (1992). "Finite Sample Evidence on the Performance of 
Stochastic Frontiers and Data Envelopment Analysis Using Panel Data," Journal 
of Econometrics, 51(1-2): 259-284). 
Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1978). "Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications 
to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement," 
American Economic Review, 68(1): 20-30. 
Hartley, P.R. and K.B. Medlock III (2007). "A Model of the Operation and Development 
of a National Oil Company," James A, Baker III Institute for Public Policy 
working paper. 
Jensen, C.M. and W.H. Meckling (1979). "Rights and Production Functions: An 
Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination," 52(4): 469-506. 
Jondrow, J., c.A.K. Lovell, I.S. Materov, and P. Schmidt (1982). "On the Estimation of 
Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model," 
Journal of Econometrics, 9(2-3): 233-238. 
Kumbhakar, S.C. (1987). "The Specification of Technical and Allocative Inefficiency in 
Stochastic Production and Profit Frontiers," Journal of Econometrics, 34(3): 335-
348. 
Kumbhakar, S.c. and C.A.K. Lovell (2000). Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1991). "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 7(Special issue): 84-105. 
Koopmans, T.C. (1951). "An Analysis of Production as an Efficient Combination of 
Activities." In Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. 
Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Monograph 13. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Metschies, G.P. (2003). International Fuel Prices 2003 - 3rd Edition. Available at 
www.intemationalfuelprices.com. 
Metschies, G.P. (2005). International Fuel Prices 2005 - 4th Edition. Available at 
www.intemationalfuelprices.com. 
Meeusen, W. and J. van dan Broeck (1977). "Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
Production Functions with Composed Error," International Econometric Review, 
18(2): 435-444. 
28 
Parker, D. (1995). "Privatization and Agency Status, Identifying the Critical Factors for 
Performance Improvement," British Journal of Management, 6: 29-43. 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (2006), "PIW's Top 50: How the Firms Stack Up," 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly: Special Supplement, 45(51): 2-3. 
Pitt, M. and L.F. Lee (1981). "The Measurement and Sources of Technical Inefficiency 
in the Indonesian Weaving Industry," Journal of Development Economics, 9:715-
723. 
Ruggiero, J. (2007). "A Comparison of DE A and Stochastic Frontier Model Using Panel 
Data," International Transactions in Operational Research, 14(3): 259-266. 
Schmidt, K.M. (1996). "The Cost and Benefits of Privatization: an Incomplete Contracts 
Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 12(1): 1-24. 
Schmidt, P. and R.c. Sickles (1984). "Production Frontiers and Panel Data," Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, 2(4): 367-374. 
Shephard, R.W. (1953). Cost and Production Functions. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
StataCorp (2007). Stata Statistical Software: Release 9. College Station, TX: StataCorp 
LP. 
Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1991). "Economic Perspectives on Privatization," The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2): 111-132. 
Villalonga, B. (2000). "Privatization and Efficiency: Differentiating Ownership Effects 
from Political, Organizational, and Dynamic Effects," Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 42: 43-74. 
II. Essay 2 - Energy Demand and Economic Growth: Relationships and 
Implications 
a. Introduction 
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Economic development causes aggregate production and consumer demand to 
evolve over time. Energy demand, which is derived from the needs of producers and 
consumers to use energy as an input, will exhibit a pattern of growth that mirrors 
structural changes induced by economic development. In general, energy intensity, 
defined as energy use per unit output, appears to increase during early stages of 
development. However, it is often claimed that processes of dematerialization (a shift in 
production toward goods and services that require less energy and material inputs) and 
saturation (a bound on the utilization rate of energy using capital) cause energy intensity 
to eventually decrease, resulting in a non-monotonic relationship between economic 
development and energy demand. We investigate these claims using a panel of 50 
countries spanning all levels of development. 
One of the innovations in our study is that we examine the evolution of energy 
consumption by energy source and end-use sector. The unique combinations of energy 
commodity and sector are labeled commodity-sectors throughout this paper. We propose 
that an additional factor, one we call capital utilization, causes short-term increase in the 
utilization of inefficient capital and therefore energy intensity in periods when economic 
growth exceeds the long-run average. Also, a decrease in the utilization of inefficient 
capital in times of economic contraction causes a short-term decrease in energy intensity. 
To accommodate this factor, we allow energy demand to be positively correlated with 
economic growth in the short-term during all stages of economic development. 
Conversely, in the long-run, we allow dematerialization and saturation to cause energy 
use to be negatively correlated with economic growth in developed economies. 
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Our model is used to compare the relationship between economic development 
and energy demand by commodity and sector. Our results by sector are consistent with 
the impact of dematerialization and saturation. However, we conclude that electricity, as 
compared to other direct-use fuels, exhibits the strongest evidence of a non-monotonic 
relationship between economic development and energy demand. Moreover, we find the 
long run income elasticity of electricity demand to be higher than direct-use fuel in earlier 
stages of economic development. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section b discusses the structural composition of 
energy demand. This is followed by a discussion of empirical research on the topic in 
section c. Our model is developed and presented in section d. Section e discusses the 
data we use in our study. The following three sections, f through h, discuss and test the 
specification of our model with respect to the set of endogenous regressors, the nature of 
the time and country-specific effects and heterogeneity of the error covariance matrix. 
Section i presents the parameter estimates and as well as simulated demand paths for a 
hypothetical country for each energy commodity-sector. Sections j and k then analyze 
and compare demand by sector and by commodity, respectively. The paper concludes in 
section k. 
b. Structural Components of Energy Demand 
The composition of production has long been a topic of interest in the field of 
development economics. Kuznets (1971) and Chenery and Syrquin (1975) first described 
the pattern of economic development in relation to the relative shares of aggregate output 
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by sector. In the first stage of economic development, industrial production begins to 
grow and displace agriculture as the single largest share of output. As consumer income 
grows, however, consumer demands shift and growth of the service sector dominates that 
of all other sectors of aggregate output. 
Since energy is a derived demand and energy requirements vary by sector, 
aggregate energy consumption can evolve in complicated ways with economic 
development. In particular, a predominately agricultural economy with largely 
subsistence farming neither requires large quantities of energy nor has significant levels 
of disposable income. Thus, energy consumption is initially low. However, as the nation 
transitions first into more market-based agriculture with more trade in agricultural 
products and later into an industrialized economy, infrastructure such as roads, ports, and 
buildings must be developed. The production of inputs (such as steel and cement) 
required for the development of necessary infrastructure is intensive in the use of energy 
and other raw materials. As a result, energy intensity increases rapidly during 
industrialization. Then as disposable income increases, demand for consumer durables 
and manufactured goods also increases. Industrial production transitions from heavy to 
light industry to accommodate increasing consumer demand for manufactured goods. 
Furthermore, services, which are relatively less energy intensive than industrial 
production, grow relative to total output. This process, known as the dematerialization of 
production, decreases the intensity of use for energy and other raw materials?4 
The saturation effect, on the other hand, relates specifically to the changing 
pattern of consumer activity as personal wealth increases. Because many of the 
manufactured goods that consumers buy (air conditioners, heaters, refrigerators and 
34 See Bernardini and Galli (1993) for more details on the process of dematerialization. 
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personal vehicles, for example) consume energy and require expanded retail and 
transportation services, the share of total energy consumption in the residential, 
transportation and commercial sectors begins to grow faster than industrial demand for 
energy. However, there is a limit, or level of saturation, at which per capita energy 
demand from these sectors can no longer increase with economic growth. For example, 
while the demand for personal vehicles increases with income, an individual may not 
operate a vehicle more than 24 hours a day. Thus the demand for transportation fuels 
will likely have some upper bound relative to individual consumption. This saturation 
effect is also likely to be present in the residential and commercial sectors due to the fact 
that the utilization rate of capital is bounded above by 100%. It should be noted, however, 
that energy consumption at the national level may continue to grow as population 
increases. 
Additionally, we propose a third factor that causes short-term increases in energy 
intensity in periods of rapid growth and decreases in energy intensity in periods of 
economic contraction. We label this process capital utilization as it relates to economic 
growth and the use of less efficient capital to increase production. 
Consumption of energy in the industrial sector is derived primarily from using 
energy as an input into the production process. Capital stock, however, is generally fixed 
in the short-term, and it is difficult to change the type of energy used to power a given 
piece of equipment. Assuming industrial producers are efficient with respect to cost 
minimization, it is likely that producers with the more energy efficient capital stock (or 
relatively low use of energy per unit output) will be lower on the supply curve. Thus, any 
increase in output must be met by producers owning less energy efficient capital. 
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Holding all else equal, energy intensity (defined as energy use per unit output) will 
increase as output expands. Similarly, inefficient capital utilization is likely to decrease 
as output decreases, causing energy intensity to also decrease. Energy demand is, 
therefore, likely to be positively correlated in the short-term with economic growth. 
However, capital stock is not fixed in the long run, and in efficient markets, additions will 
begin to reduce the share of inefficient capital stock and erode the short run increase in 
energy intensity. 
c. Analyzing Energy Demand 
Total energy demand evolves to reflect changes in the amount and composition of 
aggregate production and consumer demand. A model of energy consumption, therefore, 
must be flexible with respect to economic development. In particular, the elasticity of 
energy demand must not be constant at all levels of income, rather it must be allowed to 
decrease with economic growth. 
In modeling energy demand as a function of economic development, it is 
necessary to model each sector separately because energy demand is derived from needs, 
which vary by sector. In general, the consumption of energy in the industrial sector is 
derived from the production process, whereas energy demands in the residential and 
commercial sectors are derived from the powering of equipment and devices, and the 
heating and cooling of one's home or office. In contrast, the consumption of energy 
(primarily gasoline and diesel fuel) in the transportation sector is derived from the 
quantity and length of time that people and goods are transported. It is hypothesized that 
each sector is characterized by a decreasing elasticity of demand with respect to income. 
However, dematerialization is most likely to occur in the industrial sector, where as 
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saturation is more likely to occur in the transportation and residential and commercial 
sectors. Furthermore, short-term increases in energy intensity as a result of capital 
utilization are likely characteristic of the transportation and industrial sectors. If we 
assume both labor and energy are variable inputs, then less efficient capital stock and 
additional employees will be used to increase output, resulting in more transportation of 
the workforce and finished goods. 
There are three notable studies (Galli (1998), Judson, Schmalensee, and Stoker 
(1999) and Medlock and Soligo (2001» which use panel data and allow income elasticity 
of total energy consumption per capita to decline with economic growth. Judson, 
Schmalensee, and Stoker (1999) use panel data for 123 countries covering developed and 
less developed economies for the years 1950 through 1991. The authors estimate per 
capita energy consumption in five sectors as a function of per capita income with time 
and country-effects. The five sectors are defined as industry and construction, 
transportation, household and other, the energy sector, and non-energy uses. 
Since energy price data are not available for many countries, time effects are used 
to capture the influence of energy prices. Although the authors find a general pattern of 
declining income elasticity, the exclusion of energy prices (due to a lack of data) may 
introduce bias due to omitted variables. Including both prices and income allows the 
impact of dematerialization and saturation to be distinguishable from the impact of 
prices. Otherwise, a positive price shock resulting in reduced energy demand could be 
mistaken as an income effect due to dematerialization and saturation. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of time effects may capture short-term increases in energy intensity caused by 
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higher utilization of inefficient capital during periods of rapid economic growth. This 
would also bias the model and lead to lower estimates of short run income elasticity. 
Galli (1998) estimates trends in long-term energy intensity using an error 
correction model for a panel of 10 developing Asian economies from 1973 to 1991. A 
quadratic function in log income is used and the author finds the long run coefficient on 
squared income to be negative and significant. Although Galli's study is smaller in scope 
than the study by Judson, Schmalensee, Stoker (1999), the estimated coefficient on price 
was found to be significant. 35 
The study by Medlock and Soligo (2001) is described by the authors as a hybrid 
of Judson, Schmalensee, and Stoker (1999) and Galli (1998). For a panel of 28 countries 
from 1978 to 1995, the authors model (in logs) the per capita long run equilibrium 
demand for energy by sector as a function of real energy prices and real output per capita. 
The possibility of a non-constant income elasticity of demand is captured by including a 
log-quadratic variable for income per capita. The authors incorporate short run dynamics 
by employing the Koyck (1954) partial adjustment mechanism and find evidence that 
income elasticity declines with economic development. In particular, energy demand per 
capita is maximized at income levels near $16,000 in the industrial and other sector, 
$34,000 in the residential and commercial sector, and $533,000 in the transportation 
sector, where real per capita income is measured as GDP per capita denominated in 1995 
dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
We expand upon the research of Medlock and Soligo (2001) in several ways. 
First, we incorporate an additional parameter to capture the impact of capital utilization 
35 With respect to capital utilization, an error correction model would suffer less bias than a model in levels 
with time effects. However, the marginal impact on changes in energy consumption with respect to a 
change in output (as measured by GDP) would likely be non-linear . 
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which causes short-term increases in energy intensity in periods of economic growth. 
Second, energy demand by sector is modeled separately for electricity and all other 
energy sources, the latter of which we label as direct-use fuel. There is evidence to 
suggest that income elasticity of electricity demand also decreases with income, but not 
necessarily in the same way as direct-use fuel (see Hankinson and Rhys (1983), Ang 
(1988) and Nilsson (1993), for example). Ferguson, Wilkinson and Hill (2000) show that 
"wealthy countries have a stronger correlation between electricity use and wealth creation 
than do poor countries and that, for the global economy as a whole, there is a stronger 
correlation between electricity use and wealth creation than there is between total energy 
use and wealth." 
While large electric generators that convert direct-use fuel into electricity benefit 
from economies of scale, the use of electricity in the industrial, residential, and 
commercial sectors requires significant investment in a large, integrated transmission and 
distribution system. Moreover, electricity and direct-use fuel are not perfect substitutes 
as a result of differing physical characteristics. In particular, equipment is generally 
designed to use only one type of fuel. Even in the longer run, the energy sources are not 
perfectly substitutable because of differing cost characteristics. Transportation of 
electricity is relatively costly due to high energy loss and more especially because it 
requires point-to-point connections via transmission lines. In contrast, shipping costs for 
direct-use fuels such as petroleum products (shipped by road) and coal (shipped by rail) 
are relatively low and while the pipeline networks for shipping natural gas also are 
expensive, transmission losses are substantially lower than for electricity. Finally, while 
technologies are being developed to improve electricity storage, pumped storage is 
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currently the only effective method and is primarily used to smooth intraday price 
fluctuations. Storage of direct-use fuel however is relatively cheap and widely available 
and can arbitrage prices over longer periods of time. In summary, electricity markets are 
infrastructure intensive in that they require a vast transmission and distribution network. 
Additionally, the necessity to meet load without the use of storage requires a significant 
amount of excess capacity that remains idle most of the time. There is, therefore, a 
significant trade-off between electricity and direct-use fuel in the industrial, residential 
and commercial sectors. 
Third, our study differs from Medlock and Soligo (2001) in that we do not model 
energy consumption per capita as a function of per capita output. Instead we have chosen 
to model total energy consumption as a function of aggregate output and population. 
This allows us to separate the elasticity of energy demand with respect to income and 
population. 
Finally, the data set used by Medlock and Soligo (2001) contains statistics for 28 
countries from 1978 to 1995. Although similar, the dataset created for our study is 
unique in its inclusion of energy price statistics by energy source. We have collected data 
for 50 countries for the years 1990 to 2004. The majority of the additions are low and 
middle income countries, many from Latin America. It should be noted that these 50 
countries account for 83.9% of all commercial energy consumption in the world from 
1990 to 2004. Table II-1lists our sample countries and notes those not included in 
Medlock and Soligo (2001).36 Income data, described below, are included to highlight 
the number of low and middle income countries added. 
36 Vietnam was included in Medlock and Soligo (2001). We chose to eliminate Vietnam from our sample 
due to a lack of sufficient price data. 
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Table II-I: Sample countries and 2004 income 
GDP GDP GDP 
Country per capita Country per capita Country per capita 
2000PPP $ 2000PPP $ 2000PPP $ 
Pakistan 2,004 Uruguay* 8,374 Germany * 25,945 
Bolivia* 2,456 Malaysia 9,374 France 26,872 
India 2,851 Mexico 9,385 Japan 27,114 
Nicaragua* 3,208 South Africa * 9,533 Australia 27,840 
Indonesia 3,282 Chile* 10,168 Finland 28,116 
Ecuador* 3,740 Argentina* 11,750 Sweden 28,276 
Egypt* 3,747 Poland* 11,913 Belgium 28,379 
Sri Lanka* 3,914 Slovak Rep. * 13,329 Netherlands 28,819 
Paraguay * 4,106 Hungary * 15,254 Canada 29,136 
Philippines* 4,431 Czech Rep.* 17,270 United Kingdom 29,231 
Peru * 5,122 Portugal 18,172 Denmark 29,409 
China 5,490 Korea 18,934 Austria 29,662 
Colombia* 6,275 Greece 20,143 Switzerland* 31,310 
Panama* 6,473 New Zealand* 22,025 Ireland 33,194 
Turkey 7,055 Israel * 22,265 Norway 36,282 
Brazil 7,406 Spain 23,757 United States 36,451 
Thailand 7,453 Ital~ 25,579 
* denotes additions to Medlock and Soligo (2001) 
Figure II-1 to Figure II-8 plot (in logs) energy consumption as a function of total 
GDP and population for total final energy consumption as well as the five commodity-
sectors we model. The three end-use sectors are defined as transportation, industrial, and 
residential, commercial and agriculture (or RCA for short). The two energy commodities 
are electricity and direct-use fuels. The unique combinations of energy sources and end-
use sectors will be frequently referred to as commodity-sectors below. 37 These plots 
demonstrate that our sample spans all levels economic development and population 
throughout the 15 years of our model. 
37We test and reject the hypothesis that the model of energy consumption can be pooled by energy 
commodity and sector into one model of total energy consumption. This is presented in section i. 
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d. Commodity-Sector Model of Energy Consumption 
Letting i and t, respectively, denote country and time, consider a basic model of 
energy consumption where long run equilibrium demand ( Ei~t ) is a function of energy 
price (Pi,!)' population (POPi,t)' aggregate output (Y;,t) and technology ('l'i,t). This can 
be written as 
(II-l) 
For the purpose of this study, we dis aggregate total energy consumption by end-use 
sector ( j ) and energy commodity ( k ) such that 
E* ="" E~ . k I,t ~~ I,J"r 
j k (II-2) 
As in Judson, Schmalensee and Stoker (1999), as well as Medlock and Soligo (2001), we 
include aggregate output in our model rather than sector and commodity-specific output, 
which would have been denoted Y;,j,k,t. The reason is that GDP data is not available at 
this level of disaggregation. 
Assume every country has access to the same technology, and installed 
technology is a function of only energy prices, the level of domestic output and 
population. Thus 'l'i,j,k,t = 'l'(Pi,j,k,t' POPi,t' Y;.t) and 
A 
= f (Pi,j,k,t' POPi,t' Y;,t) (II-3) 
Therefore, one need not model technology explicitly. While this assumption is made to 
simplify the model, we later test its validity by including time effects (in the form of 
dummy variables for each year) in the estimation of the model. An inability to reject the 
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hypothesis that the year dummies are jointly equal to zero leads us to conclude our results 
are not biased by an omission of modeling technology explicitly. 
Also, a large share of energy consumption is derived from the demand for space-
heating and cooling. As a result, weather (specifically temperature) has a significant 
impact on total energy demand. To incorporate temperature into our model, we use total 
heating degree days squared per year for each country. 38, 39 To define heating degree 
days, let d be a day in year t E {l, 2, ... , T} and temp d be the average of the maximum and 
minimum temperatures, measured in degrees Fahrenheit. The number of heating degree 
days on day d in country i is defined as HDDi,d = max {65 - temPi,d' O}. Thus, including 
heating degree days in a model of energy demand would allow one to estimate the 
elasticity of demand with respect to one degree if the temperature is below 65 degrees.4o 
However, we find elasticity of demand is nonlinear with respect to temperature and 
include a parameter of heating degree days squared. Specifically, we include 
2 
hddi~t = "'d""Et'--__ _ 
1000 
(II-4) 
38 In a fixed effect setting for panel data, omitting heating degree days increases the individual effects to 
capture that country's average demand for heating. However, in this specification, the clustering of 
countries across continents renders the time effects in the RCA sector significant because of year-specific 
heterogeneity resulting from regional winter weather patterns. Explicitly including heating degree days 
does not eliminate this problem. However, including the squared term causes the joint time effects to be 
insignificantly different than zero. 
39 We tested and rejected the significance of cooling degree days (in levels and squared) in the model. In 
the fixed effect setting, omitting cooling degree days increases the individual intercept for countries with 
significant cooling demand. Where as the exclusion of heating degree day data caused time effects to 
capture regional cold weather patterns, the exclusion of cooling degree data did not have the same result for 
hot weather patterns. 
40 The use of heating degree days is fairly common within the energy industry. Similarly, cooling degree 
days and total degree days are often used. However, we found cooling degree days to be insignificant in 
each commodity-sector of our model. 
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to capture marginally increasing demand for energy for every degree of colder 
temperature. 
To allow income elasticity of demand to be non-constant with respect to GDP, we 
adopt an energy demand function similar to the one specified by Medlock and Soligo 
(2001).41 The function we use is 
* h. b b b Z b E., =.1" p~,j,k pop, 2,j,k Y; 3,j,k exp(y. ) 4,j,k exp(hdd. ) 5,j,k 
I,j,k,t "'i,j,k,t I,j,k,t I,t I,t I,t I,t (11-5) 
where Yi t = (Y; t /1000) / POPi t is simply output per capita (divided by 1000) and the 
" , 
parameters for each sector and energy source are unique. Taking the natural logarithm of 
(11-5) yields 
In E;j,k,t = In A;,j,k,t + b\,j,k In Pi,j,k,t + bZ,j,k In pOP;,t 
+b3,j,k In Y;,I + b 4,j,k Yi,t + b5,j,khdd;~1 
(11-6) 
Time effects and country-specific effects are embodied in the variable A,j,k,I' Denoting 
the individual country effects for each energy commodity-sector as a;,j,k and the time 
effects for each sector and energy source as OJ,k,I' then 
InE~'k =a, 'k+O'k +b\ 'klnp, 'k +bz ·klnpop. I,j, ,I I,j, j, ,I ,j, I,j, ,I ,j, 1,1 
+b3,j,k In Y;,I + b 4 ,j,k Y;,I + b5,j,khdd;~t 
(11-7) 
is the long-run equilibrium demand function. 
Note that several countries in our sample are in warm climates where the average 
temperature does not drop below 65. Because the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, 
we use heating degree days squared (hdd;Zt ) in levels in equation (11-7). Also, per capita 
41 • , * A ",. b, .+b,lnYit * Medlock and Sohgo (2001) use the functIOn eC;,j,t =, "i,jP;,j',tY;/ ,j 'where eCi,j,t denotes energy 
consumption per capita in country i, in sector j , at time t. A,j' P;,j,t and Yi,t are the country and sector 
specific intercept, price and income per capita, respectively. 
income is included in levels to avoid the problem of multicollinearity with total income 
and population. 
Given the demand function specified in equation (11-7), the long-run income 
elasticity of energy demand is 
*y 
Ci,j,k,t 
aln E* k 
I,J, ,t xr: 
ar: l,t 
l,t 
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=b3 'k +b4 'kY' ,J, ,J, l,t (11-8) 
b4 'kY 
-b + ,J, l,t 
- 3,j,k 1000* pop, 
l,t 
for each, country, sector and commodity. If b3 ' k > 0 and b4 ' k < 0, income elasticity is 
,J, ,J, 
initially positive and decreases as per capita income grows. Moreover, the relationship 
between demand and economic is non-monotonic and the demand maximizing level of 
income can be solved by setting (11-8) to zero and solving for Yi,t' 
* -b3 ' k Y max = __ ,J_, 
b4,j,k 
Furthermore, the long run elasticity with respect to population is 
* pop 
Ci,j,k,t 
alnE* 'k I,J, ,t X 
-:-. POPi,t 
°POPi,t 
=b2 'k- b5'kY' ,J, ,J, l,t 
b5 'kY 
_ b _ ,J, l,t 
- 2,j,k 1000* pop, 
l,t 
(11-9) 
(11-10) 
for each sector and energy source. If b2,j,k > 0 and b5 ,j,k < 0, elasticity with respect to 
population is increasing with economic growth. 
Finally, the model must incorporate short run dynamics. We opt to implement the 
Koyck (1954) partial adjustment mechanism, 
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( E J (E* J0'k i,j,k,l i,j,k,t 
Ei,j,k,t-l - Ei,j,k,l-l ' 
(11-11) 
which describes the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium for each sector and energy 
source.42 Taking the natural logarithm of this expression and rearranging the terms yields 
In E. . k = r· k In E~ . k + (1- r· k) In E . . k l' 
',J, ,I J, ',J, ,I J, ',J, ,t- (11-12) 
In this specification, contemporaneous demand is a function of the long run equilibrium 
(i.e. contemporaneous price, population, total GDP, GDP per capita and heating degree 
days squared) and lagged energy demand (which represents the stock of energy using 
capital). The parameter rj,k' which is bounded by zero and one, represents the portion of 
demand that responds to contemporaneous factors. If rj,k = 1, capital stock and demand 
adjust instantly to the long run equilibrium. However, if rj,k = 0, then capital stock is 
permanently fixed and the adjustment is infinitely long. 
This flow adjustment model, however, does not capture the change in the 
utilization rate of capital and energy intensity in times of rapid economic expansion or 
contraction if rj,k < 1. Recall that consumption of energy in the industrial sector is 
derived primarily from using energy as an input into the production of goods. If output 
(as measured by total GDP in our model) grows at a constant rate, g, then additions to 
capital stock can converge in the long run to some constant rate, k, such that the short 
run change in capital utilization and energy intensity equal zero in every period. Thus we 
assume k = f (g) in this case. Alternatively, if the output growth rate is random, gl ' 
42 Baltagi and Griffin (1997) also use a similar adjustment mechanism in their dynamic model of gasoline 
demand. Galli (1998), however, uses an error correction model. We choose to use the Koyck (1954) 
partial adjustment mechanism to be consistent with Medlock and Soligo (2001). 
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and capital additions are fixed at k in the short run, then capital utilization and energy 
intensity must vary in the short-run. However, if gt averages g in the long run, then 
additions to capital stock at constant rate of k cause changes in capital utilization and 
energy intensity to average zero in the long run. In this case, there are periods when the 
change in output exceeds the long run average growth rate, gt > g , and capital additions, 
k < f (gt ) , are insufficient to prevent an increase in energy intensity and capital 
utilization in the short run as less efficient capital is used to increase production. When 
output growth falls below the long run average, gt < g and k > f (gt ), utilization of 
inefficient capital decreases and energy intensity decreases. 
In our paper, we assume that capital additions are a function of average total GDP 
growth for each country, gi and are fixed at a constant rate, ki . Letting gi equal the 
long run average growth rate for each country, then ki = f (gi ) for each country i. 
Furthermore, we assume the change in capital utilization is a function of total GDP 
growth and capital additions, Ki,t = f (gi,t - ki ) = f (gi,t - gi ). Thus, the change in 
capital utilization is a function of the deviation from the long run average growth rate. It 
is computed by taking the difference between the change in log GDP in period t and the 
average change in log GDP in the previous 10 years. Formally, 
1 t-I 
Ki,t = (In ~,t -In ~,t-I) - 1 0 s~o (In ~,s -In ~,s-I ) 
(11-13) 
1 
= (ln~,t -In ~,t-I) - 10 (In ~,t-I -In ~,t-ll) 
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where over a sufficient length of time, the average deviation from the long run GDP 
growth rate will converge to zero.43 
Adding Ki,1 to (11-12), our short run model becomes 
(11-14) 
Substituting the long-run equilibrium demand function described by equation (11-7) into 
(11-14) yields 
lnE. ·kl=Y·ka. 'k+Y'k8'k +Y'kbJ'klnp"k +Y'kb2 'klnpop. + I,j, , j, I,j, j, j, ,I j, ,j, I,j, ,I j, ,j, 1,1 
Yj,kb3,j,k In :r;,1 + Yj,kb4,j,kYi,t + Yj,kb5,j,khddi~1 + 8j,k K i,1 + (1- Yj,k ) In Ei,j,k,t-J ' (II-15) 
the short run dynamic model of energy consumption for each country, sector and energy 
source. Let Yj,kai,j,k = ai,j,k' Yj,k8j,k,1 = 9j,k,1 ' and Yj,kbn,j,k = fJn,j,k for n = 1, 2, ... , 5. Thus, 
the model we wish to estimate is 
In E. . k = a . . k + AI. k + flJ . kIn p . . k + 112 . k In pop. + fJ3 . kIn Y I,j, ,I I,j, orj, ,I PI,j, I,j, ,I ,j, 1,1 ,j, 1,1 
+P.4 'kY' +/15 'k hdd2 +8· kK. +(I-Y·k)lnE.· k J+U" k ,j, 1,1 ,j, 1,1 j, l,t j, I,j, ,1- I,j, ,I 
(11-16) 
where ai,j,k' the country-specific effect for each commodity-sector, may be treated as 
random or fixed. 
e. Data 
Energy consumption statistics for the majority of our sample were collected from 
the International Energy Agency's (lEA) energy balances for both OECD and non-OECD 
countries. The dataset was checked for accuracy and consistency against a variety of 
43 The pooled sample mean of the deviation from the long run GDP growth rate, Ki,I' is equal to 0.0003 
with a standard deviation of 0.0340 for the 50 countries in our study from 1990 to 2004. Thus we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the average deviation from the long-run GDP growth rate is equal to zero in our 
study. 
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sources including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Energy Database and The 
Energy Statistics Database published by the Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE). 
Energy demand is defined as end-use consumption of commercial energy 44 by 
commodity and sector. As stated previously, the sectors are industrial, transportation and 
commercial, residential, and agriculture (RCA). Industrial demand also includes "non-
energy use" to capture the demand for some petroleum products and petrochemical 
feedstock which are not consumed for the purpose of providing energy. The energy 
commodities are electricity and all other direct-use fuels. Direct-use fuels include coal, 
petroleum products, natural gas, geothermal energy, solar, and wind. For the 
transportation sector, however, we choose to model total energy consumption rather than 
electricity and direct-use fuel separately because the share of electricity in total energy 
consumption for transportation is less than 1.5% for each country in our sample. 
As a measure of aggregate output, we use real GDP denominated in 2000 dollars 
adjusted for purchasing power parity. GDP, consumer prices indices, wholesale price 
indices and population statistics were collected from the World Development Indicators 
database published by the World Bank. Missing series and observations were collected 
from the United Nations' Common Database. 
Temperature data was collected from the Global Summary of the Day published 
by the National Climate Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration of the United States Department of Commerce. The daily average of the 
44 Commercial energy excludes combustible renewables and waste such as industrial waste, municipal 
waste and biomass. While the lEA does publish a data series for combustible renewables and waste, it 
warns that the data is incomplete and not comparable across countries. Therefore, we focus on the impact 
of economic growth on commercial energy, which in any case is a better reflection of internationally traded 
energy commodities. 
high and low temperature in the capital city is used to compute annual total heating 
degree days for each country in our sample. 
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We collected energy prices for each energy commodity-sector for all 50 countries 
in our study. While energy price statistics for OEeD members and Latin America are 
widely published, the search for the remainder of the energy price data was extensive. 
We used the Energy Prices and Taxes data series published by the lEA for OEeD 
members. The energy price index for transportation is the real household price index for 
unleaded gasoline. The share of industrial consumption of electricity, the real industrial 
price of electricity and the real industrial price for total energy are used to compute the 
share-weighted price of direct-use fuels for industrial consumers. Similarly, the real 
share-weighted household price indices of electricity and total energy are used to 
calculate the real share-weighted prices of electricity and direct-use fuels in the ReA 
sector. 
For each member of OLADE, the Latin American Energy Organization, The 
Energy Statistics Database contains detailed statistics of nominal energy prices by fuel 
and sector. The real energy price index for transportation is computed using the 
consumption-weighted average nominal prices of gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil and fuel 
oil deflated by the consumer price index. The real industrial price index for electricity is 
calculated from the nominal price of industrial electricity and the wholesale price index. 
The real industrial price of direct-use fuels is obtained from the consumption-weighted 
nominal prices of the remaining fuels (natural gas, coal, liquid petroleum gases, diesel 
oil, and fuel oil) deflated by the wholesale price index. A similar methodology is applied 
to obtain the nominal price indices for electricity and direct-use fuels for each of the three 
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components of the RCA sector. Then the consumption-weighted average nominal prices 
of electricity and direct-use fuels are deflated by the consumer price index to obtain the 
real RCA price indices of electricity and direct-use fuels. 
The collection of price statistics was far more complicated for the remainder of 
our sample. These countries include China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand. Using a variety of sources, we 
extracted the real price of electricity and direct-use fuels from the components of 
consumer and wholesale price reports. Sources included national statistical websites, 
annual statistical yearbooks, the United Nations' Statistical Yearbookfor Asia and the 
Pacific, and the International Labor Organization's Laborsta Internet database. 
f. Model Specification: Endogenous Regressors 
Recall equation (II-16), which describes the dynamic consumption model we wish 
to estimate for the five energy commodity-sector combinations we have defined. 
In E. . k = a· . k + AI. k + RJ . kin p . . k + /12 . k In pop. + /13 . kin Y 1,.1, ,t I,J, 'f'J,,t PI,J, I,J, ,t ,J, I,t ,J, I,t 
+R4 'kY' +/15 'k hdd2 +b·kK. +(I-Y·k)lnE.· k j+U" k p. ,J, I,t ,J, l,t J, I,t J, I,J, ,t- I,J, ,t 
(II-17) 
In a panel setting, model estimation is complicated by the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable. Obviously, energy consumption (In Ei,j,k,t) is function of the country 
effect (ai,j,k ) in this specification. Thus, the lagged consumption variable (In Ei,j,k,t-J ) is 
also a function of the country effect (ai,j,k)' This causes the standard OLS-based fixed or 
random effects estimator to be biased and inconsistent. 45 
45 For a thorough discussion of panel data estimation see Baltagi (2008). To name just a few, see Greene 
(2003), Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Ahn 
and Schmidt (1995) for a discussion of dynamic panel data. 
51 
We choose to estimate equation (11-16) using two-stage least squares (2SLS) as 
suggested by Balestra and Nerlove (1966).46 The instruments are current and lagged 
values of the regressors. We do not assume, however, that lagged energy consumption is 
endogenous or that the remainder of the regressor set is exogenous. Instead, we estimate 
the model using the 2SLS-within estimator assuming one-way (country-specific) fixed 
effects 47 and perform the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity of each 
regressor. The null hypothesis is that the OLS-within estimator of the model is 
consistent. The DWH test is essentially a Hausman test in which the covariance matrices 
for both 2SLS-within and the OLS-within estimator are based on the estimated error 
variance of the OLS-within estimator. 
Lagged Energy Demand 
First, we estimate the model assuming only lagged consumption, In Ei,j,k,t-l , is 
endogenous. The critical value of the DWH test, distributed as %2 (1), is 3.84 at the 5% 
level and 6.63 at the 1 % level. The results are presented in Table 11-2 under Specification 
A. The test statistic is 2.12 for the transportation sector, 7.33 for industrial electricity, 
17.75 for industrial direct-use, 8.25 for RCA electricity and 0.42 RCA direct-use fuels. 
Thus we reject the null hypothesis that we can consistently estimate our model using the 
OLS-within estimator in favor of 2SLS-within for three of the five commodity-sector 
combinations. Further, for consistency across the five models and given both empirical 
46 We chose to use the approach by Balestra and Nerlove (1966) to be consistent with Medlock and Soligo 
(2001). Alternatively, we could have used the procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). In this 
specification, the country-specific heterogeneity is removed by first differencing the model and estimating 
the parameters using a GMM estimator. The instrument set is composed of lagged levels of the 
endogenous variables and first differences of the exogenous variables. The system GMM is another 
alternative suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
47 Further testing, described below, suggests that the assumption of a one-way fixed country effects model 
is appropriate. 
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and theoretical evidence, we will maintain the assumption throughout the rest of the 
paper that lagged energy demand is endogenous in each commodity-sector specification. 
Table 11-2: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the exogeneity of regressors 
Specification: A B C D E F G 
Regressor: In E;,j,k,1 InY In P;,J,k,1 Yi,t In POP;,I hdd 2 K 
',I ',I ',I 
Transportation 2.12 4.77** 1.21 0.34 9.13*** 0.45 6.46** 
Ind Electricity 7.33*** 4.44** 0.12 0.30 3.87** 0.02 3.48 
Ind Direct -use 17.75*** 1.67 1.14 1.67 2.60 0.89 0.35 
RCA Electricity 8.25*** 0.69 3.30 0.02 1.02 10.49*** 1.33 
RCA Direct-use 0.42 0.23 2.06 2.23 7.51*** 32.99*** 0.30 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is distributed as X 2 (1). The null hypothesis is that the OLS-within 
estimator is consistent. Rejection of the null implies the regressor is endogenous to energy consumption. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. The critical value is 3,84. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the I % level. The critical value is 6.63. 
Total GDP 
The exogeneity of the remaining regressors is also tested. The results are 
presented in Table II-3 under Specifications B through G. In each specification, only one 
additional variable is added to the set of endogenous regressors (and removed from the 
set of exogenous regressors). For example, in Specification B, total GDP (In Y;,t ) is 
included with lagged energy consumption to form the set of endogenous regressors. The 
DWH test statistics are reported in Table II-2. Also distributed as X\I) , the null 
hypothesis that total income is exogenous in our model of energy consumption is rejected 
at the 1 % level for none of the commodity-sectors and 5% in only the transportation 
sector and industrial electricity sector. The test statistics are 4.77 for transportation, 4.44 
for industrial electricity, 1.67 for industrial direct-use fuel, 0.69 for RCA electricity, and 
0.23 for RCA direct-use fuel. Given only weak evidence of endogeneity, we opt to 
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assume log GDP is exogenous in our model of energy demand to maintain symmetry 
across the five commodity-sectors.48 
Price 
In Specification C, the set of endogenous regressors is price (In Pi,j,k,t ) and lagged 
energy demand while the set of exogenous regressors is total GDP, GDP per capita, 
population, and our parameters for the capital utilization and heating degree days 
squared. In no energy commodity-sector can we reject the hypothesis that price is 
exogenous with respect to contemporaneous consumption. 
While it is fairly standard to treat price as exogenous in a model of energy 
demand, it need not be the case, particularly in our specification of energy consumption. 
Specifically, there is a transparent international market for the majority of direct-use fuels 
in which energy consumers are likely to be price takers. However, due to transmission 
constraints, electricity markets tend to be highly regionalized even within one nation's 
borders. For example, cold weather could result in an increase in electricity use as space 
heating demand increases. In a deregulated market, prices will increase to signal 
generators to produce more power. Thus, consumers may not be strictly price-takers, and 
the assumption of price exogeneity may be erroneous. 
The inability to reject the hypothesis of price exogeneity in our model is likely a 
result of the unique aspects of global energy markets, as well as the use of yearly data and 
a dis aggregated specification of energy demand. First, there are many inefficiencies in 
48 Empirical evidence on the exogeneity of income is mixed. Darrat, Gilley, and Meyer (1996), Stern 
(1993,2000), and Moroney (1992) study the causal relationship between total energy consumption and 
income. More recently, the causal relationship between income and electricity consumption has been 
analyzed by authors such as Wolde-Rufael (2006) and Ferguson, Wilkenson, and Hill (2006) which has 
also yielded mixed results. 
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energy markets world-wide and across commodities which may hinder the ability of 
energy prices to respond to demand. For example, national policies designed to promote 
economic development may support fuel and electricity subsidies, fixed prices and price 
caps. Also, the global crude oil market is dominated by a cartel, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which controls roughly 40% of the world's 
crude oil production. According to OPEC, it "seeks to ensure the stabilization of oil 
prices in international oil markets, with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary 
fluctuations." Production quotas are the organization's primary tool in its battle against 
price volatility. The following quote from OPEC alone provides support to the notion 
that price is exogenous to energy demand. "If demand grows, or some producers supply 
less oil, OPEC can increase its oil production to prevent a sudden rise in prices or 
shortfall in supply.,,49 
Second, the use of yearly data likely masks the impact of short term events on 
demand, as well as price. For example, consider the U.S. natural gas market which has a 
well-developed, transparent daily spot market. On extremely cold winter days, spot 
prices rise sharply in response to increased demand for home heating. However, when 
price and demand are averaged over the entire year, these short term events may no 
longer be significant. 
Finally, the disaggregation of energy demand into five commodity-sector 
combinations, also likely lends support to the exogeneity of price on energy demand. As 
discussed previously, electricity consumption is a derived demand which likely differs 
substantially between industrial users and residential (or RCA) users. Thus, one sector 
may have little impact on the overall electricity market. It is interesting to note, however, 
49 Frequently Asked Questions, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, March 2009. 
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that when we estimate the same model using Specification C for total energy demand and 
total commodity-sector weighted prices, the DHW statistic is 7.88. One can safely reject 
the null hypothesis at the 1 % level, suggesting that energy prices are indeed a function of 
aggregate energy demand. Nonetheless, we proceed assuming price exogeneity in the 
five models of energy commodity-sector demand. 
GDP per Capita 
In Specification D, the set of endogenous regressors is composed of GDP per 
capita ( Yi,t ) and lagged energy demand while the exogenous regressors are total GDP 
price, population, and our parameters for capital inefficiency and heating degree days 
squared. Recall the DWH test statistic is distributed as %2(1), the 5% critical value is 
3.83 and the 1 % critical value is 6.63. Our tests yields statistics equal to 0.34 for 
transportation, 0.30 for industrial electricity, 1.67 for industrial direct-use fuel, 0.02 for 
RCA electricity and 2.23 for RCA direct-use fuel. Thus, we can not reject the hypothesis 
that income per capita is exogenous in the five commodity-sectors. 
Population 
The exogeneity of population is tested in Specification E. While there seems to 
be no economic justification for population to be a function of energy demand, the DWH 
test statistic for endogeneity is significant at the 1 % level for transportation and 5% level 
for RCA direct-use. Specifically, the test statistics are 9.13 for transportation, 3.87 for 
industrial electricity, 2.60 for industrial direct-use fuel, 1.02 for RCA electricity and 7.51 
for RCA direct-use fuel. Because we find that the test statistic is insignificant for total 
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energy demand and want to maintain consistency across all commodity-sectors, we chose 
to assume population is exogenous. 
Squared Heating Degree Days 
The exogeneity of the last regressor, squared heating degree days (hddi~t ), is 
tested in Specification F. While the endogeneity of squared heating degree days can not 
be rejected in either RCA electricity or RCA direct-use, it can be rejected in the 
remaining three commodity-sectors. The DWH test statistic is 0.45 for transportation, 
0.02 for industrial electricity, 0.89 for industrial direct-use fuels, 10.49 for RCA 
electricity and 32.99 for RCA direct-use fuels. Recall that heating degree days are used 
to capture demand for space heating, which is the result of cold weather. Because there is 
no plausible theory to support this endogeneity in the RCA sector, we chose to assume 
squared heating degree days are exogenous. 
Capital Utilization 
Finally recall the definition of the change in capital utilization variable which is 
defined as the deviation from the long run GDP growth rate in equation (II-13). 
In Specification G, we test the exogeneity of Ki,t' The DWH test statistic is 6.46 for 
transportation, 3.48 for industrial electricity, 0.35 for industrial direct-use fuels, 1.33 for 
RCA electricity and 0.30 for RCA direct-use fuels. Thus at the 1 % level, we can not 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in any of the five commodity-sector 
combinations. Although the DWH test statistic is significant at the 5% level in the 
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transportation sector, to maintain a similar model across all five energy commodity-sector 
the change in capital utilization is assumed to be exogenous throughout the rest of this 
paper. 
g. Model Specification: Country and Time Effects 
It remains to test the significance and nature of the effects of the explanatory 
variables in our model of energy demand. We maintain the assumption that lagged 
demand is the only endogenous regressor. In the analysis to follow, we use 2SLS-panel 
estimators where the instruments are present and lagged values of the regressors and rely 
heavily on the F-test. Wooldridge (1990) points out that the distribution of the F-statistic 
for the 2SLS estimator is unknown, even asymptotically. Thus, inferences made from the 
standard F-statistic can be misleading. Instead, Wooldridge suggests using the sum of 
squared residuals from the second-stage regression for both the restricted and unrestricted 
estimations in the numerator. The denominator remains the residuals from the 2SLS 
estimation. We follow this methodology in each of the F-testsbelow. 
Joint Significance of Country and Time Effects 
For our model, we first test the joint significance of the country and time effects 
in equation (11-16) above. The unrestricted estimation is a two-way 2SLS-within 
estimator where the intercept is allowed to vary by year and country while the slopes for 
the exogenous variables are assumed to be constant. The restricted model uses pooled 
2SLS which assumes the slopes and intercept are homogeneous across all countries. This 
amounts to a 2SLS F-test of the null hypothesis that both the country and time effects are 
equal to zero, i.e. ai,j,k = ¢Jj,k,t = o. Letting N, T and K respectively equal the number of 
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countries, years and regressors (excluding the constant) in our model, the number of 
restrictions equals (N -1) + (T -1), and the number of degrees of freedom is 
(N -l)(T -1) - K. Recall that we have a panel of 50 countries across 15 years and that 
there are 7 regressors. Therefore, the 2SLS F-test for joint fixed effects is distributed as 
F(63,679) where the 5% critical value equals 1.33 and the 1 % critical value equals 1.49. 
The results, presented in Table II-3, show that the null hypothesis of zero country and 
time effects is strongly rejected in each of the five energy commodity-sector 
specifications. Specifically, the 2SLS F-statistic equals 3.96 for transportation, 4.50 for 
industrial electricity, 2.17 for industrial direct-use fuels, 5.05 for RCA electricity and 
2.54 for RCA direct-use fuels. 
Table 11-3: 2SLS F-test for the significance of effects 
Null Hypothesis: a;,j,k = O,f/Jj,k.t = 0 f/J, =0 j,k,t a"k =0 I,j, 
Distribution: F(63,679) F(14,679) F(49,693) 
CV5%: 1.33 1.71 1.37 
CVl%: 1.49 2.11 1.56 
Transportation 3.96*** 1.37 4,65*** 
Industrial Electricity 4,50*** 1.39 5,34*** 
Industry Direct-use 2.17*** 1.55 2.30*** 
RCA Electricity 5,05*** 0.54 6.42*** 
RCA Direct-use 2,54*** 1.42 2,83*** 
Note that the computation of the F-statistic for 2SLS requires the use of the sum of squared residuals from 
the second-stage regression for both the restricted and unrestricted estimation for the numerator. The 
denominator, however, uses the sum of squared residuals from the 2SLS regression for the unrestricted 
modeL See Wooldridge (1990). 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% leveL 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % leveL 
Significance of Time Effects 
Next we test the assumption that time effects are equal to zero while still allowing 
for country-specific fixed effects. The unrestricted estimation remains the two-way 
2SLS-within estimator where the slopes are assumed to be constant and the intercept is 
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allowed to vary by year. However, the restricted model becomes the one-way 2SLS-
within estimator where the slopes are common but the intercept may vary by country but 
not by year. Although the number of degrees of freedom remains unchanged, there are 
now (T -1) restrictions. The F-statistic for this test is distributed as F (14,679) with a 
5% critical value of 1.71 and a 1 % critical value of 2.11. As shown in Table 11-3, we can 
not reject the null hypothesis that the time effects are equal to zero, ¢Jj,k,t = 0, at even the 
5% level in any of the five energy commodity-sectors. The 2SLS F-statistic is 1.37 for 
transportation, 1.39 for industrial electricity, 1.55 for industrial direct-use fuels, 0.54 for 
RCA electricity and 1.42 for RCA direct-use fuels. We therefore conclude that it is 
reasonable to exclude time effects from our model of energy demand. 
Significance of Country Effects 
Because we strongly rejected the hypothesis that country and time effects are 
jointly equal to zero but not the hypothesis that time effects are equal to zero, one may 
reasonably conclude that the country effects must be significant. We demonstrate this 
with a third set of 2SLS F-tests, which are presented in the last column of Table 11-3. 
Here the unrestricted model is the one-way 2SLS-within estimator allowing for only 
country-specific heterogeneity in the intercept. Again, the slopes on the exogenous 
variables are assumed to be common. The restricted model is the pooled-2SLS model 
with a common intercept and common slopes. There are now (N -1) restrictions and 
N (T -1) - K degrees of freedom. Note that the number of degrees of freedom has 
increased from 679 to 693 because we no longer need to estimate the time effect 
parameters. The critical values for an F-statistic distributed as F(49,693) are 1.37 at the 
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5% level and 1.56 at the 1 % level. We easily reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
one-way 2SLS-within estimator for all five energy commodity-sectors. The 2SLS F-
statistic is equal to 4.65 for transportation, 5.34 for industrial electricity, 2.30 for 
industrial direct-use fuels, 6.34 for RCA electricity and 2.83 for RCA direct-use fuels. 
Fixed vs. Random Country Effects 
Finally, the one-way country effects may be treated as either fixed or random. 
The fixed effects model allows the effect to be correlated with the regressors and is 
always consistent. However, if the country effects are strictly uncorrelated with the 
regressors, the random effect estimator is consistent and efficient since it decreases the 
number of parameters to be estimated by (N-l). Thus, we perform a Hausman-type test 
to compare the estimated coefficients. Under the null hypothesis, the effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors. Therefore, there will be no systematic difference 
between the fixed and random effects parameter estimates since each will converge to its 
true value. 
Table 11-4: Hausman test for random effects 
Null Hypothesis: 2SLS-GLS is consistent 
Distribution: Z2 (7) 
CV 5%: 14.1 
CV 1%: 18.5 
Transportation 61.2*** 
Industrial Electricity 79.2*** 
Industry Direct-use 43.0*** 
RCA Electricity 421.4*** 
RCA Direct-use 96.8*** 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
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For this Hausman test, the consistent estimator is 2SLS-within while the efficient 
(and consistent under the null hypothesis) estimator is 2SLS-GLS. The test is distributed 
as .%2 (7) with critical values equal to 14.1 at the 5% level and IS.5 at the 1 % level. The 
results are presented in Table 11-4. For each of the five energy commodity-sectors, we 
easily reject the 2SLS-GLS estimator in favor of the 2SLS-within estimator. The test 
statistic is 61.2 for transportation, 79.2 for industrial electricity, 43.0 for industrial direct-
use, 421.4 for RCA electricity and 96.S for RCA direct-use. 
h. Model Specification: Error Covariance Matrix 
Consider a basic fixed effects model, Yi,l = xi,lP + vi,l where the composite error is 
Vi I = ai + ui I' Efficient estimation of the 2SLS-within model requires the idiosyncratic , , 
errors, ui,l' to be homoskedastic and serially correlated. Speficially, E ( u i u i ') = O";IT ' 
and it can be shown (see Wooldridge (2002) or Baltagi (200S), for example) that under 
this condition, the serial correlation takes a special form, namely, 
corr (ui,t' ui,s ) = -lI(T -1) for all t"* s . 
As suggested by Wooldridge (2002), we test our model to determine if the 
estimated idiosyncratic errors exhibit this form of serial correlation. Using the predicted 
errors of our model (purged of the fixed effect), we perform a pooled OLS regression of 
Ui,j,k,l on Ui,j,k,l-l using the Huber-White robust estimates of the standard errors. The null 
hypothesis is that the coefficient on Ui,j,k,l-l equals corr( Ui,j,k,I,Ui,j,k,l-l) or -0.0714, in the 
case of our model. The test is distributed as F(1,69S) with critical values equal to 3.S5 
at the 5% level and 6.67 at the 1 % level. For all sectors and commodities, we are unable 
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reject the null that corr( Uj,j,k,t,Uj,j,k,t-l) = -1/(T -1) at the 1 % level. At the 5% level, 
this test is rejected only for industrial electricity demand. Table 11-5 contains the 
resulting F-statistics for this test. Specifically, the test statistics are 0.01 for 
transportation, 5.80 for industrial electricity, 0.79 for industrial direct-use fuels, 1.18 for 
RCA electricity, and 0.03 for RCA direct-use fuels. 
Table 11-5: Tests for serial correlation and homoskedasticity 
Null Hypothesis: corr (Uj,j,k,t' Uj,j,k,t_l) = -1 I (T -1) 
Distribution: F (1,698) 
CV 5%: 3.85 
CV 1%: 6.67 
Transportation 0.01 
Industrial Electricity 5.80** 
Industry Direct-use 0.79 
RCA Electricity 1.18 
RCA Direct-use 0.03 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
O';,j = 0'; for all i = 1,2, ... , N 
X2 (50) 
67.5 
76.2 
6,101.4*** 
22,356.3*** 
15,910.0*** 
3,416.7*** 
3,697.5*** 
This test, however, does not preclude heteroskedasticity. We, therefore, perform 
a modified Wald test for the presence of country-specific heterogeneity of the error 
variances, as suggested by Greene (2003). The null hypothesis is O';,j = 0'; for all 
i = 1,2, ... ,50. The critical values for this test, which is distributed as X2 (50), are 67.5 at 
the 5% level and 76.2 at the 1 % level. The results are presented in the last column of 
Table 11-5. Notice we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in favor of country-
specific heterogeneity of the error variances for all energy commodity-sector 
combinations. The test statistics are 6101 for transportation, 22356 for industrial 
electricity, 15910 for industrial direct-use fuels, 3417 for RCA electricity and 3678 for 
RCA direct-use fuels. 
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Given the strong evidence of heteroskedasticity of the idiosyncratic errors, we opt 
to use the 2SLS-within robust variance estimator suggested by Arellano (1987). It should 
be noted that altering the specification of the standard errors has no impact on the 
parameter estimates of the coefficients. However, the use of robust standard errors will 
yield more conservative estimates of standard errors and parameter significance. 
i. Model Estimation and Simulated Demand Paths 
The 2SLS-within parameter estimates and robust standard errors for the short-run 
coefficients in our model of energy consumption (equation (11-16» are presented in Table 
11-6. Recall previous tests indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the time 
effects, f/Jj,k,t' are all jointly equal to zero in each commodity-sector. Therefore, the time 
effects are omitted from the estimation of our model. The implied coefficients of the 
long-run model (equation (11-7» are presented below the short-run parameter estimates. 
Finally, if b3 > 0 and b4 < 0, then the income level at which the long run income 
elasticity equals zero, i.e. eY' = 0 , maximizes demand. This is denoted y"max in Table 
11-6. 
In general, all parameter estimates significantly different than zero have the 
appropriate sign. Moreover, patterns of significance across sectors and commodities lend 
support to disaggregating total energy consumption into the demand for transportation 
fuels, industrial electricity, industrial direct-use fuels, RCA electricity and RCA direct-
use fuels. For example, price elasticity appears highest in the transportation sector and 
for electricity in general while elasticity with respect to temperature (implied by the 
parameter on heating degree days squared) appears highest in the RCA sector. 
Table 11-6: Estimation results for the five energy commodity-sectors 
Short-run energy demand model (equation (11-16) excluding time effects): 
In E. 'k = a, 'k + Rl 'k In P' 'k + P2 'k In pop, + P3 'k In Y !,j, ,t !,J, Pl,j, l,j, ,I ,j, 1,1 ,j, !,t 
+P.4 'kY' +P.5 'khdd~ +8'kK. +(I-Y'k)lnE. 'k I+U, 'k ,J, !,t ,J, !,t j, !,I j, !,j, ,t- l,j, ,I 
Long-run energy demand model (equation (11-7) excluding time effects): 
In • 2 Ei,j,k,1 = ai,j,k + b1,j,k In Pi,j,k,1 + b 2,j,k In pOPi,t + b 3,j,k In Y;,I + b 4,j,kYi,1 + b 5,j,khddi,1 
Sector: Transport Industrial Industrial RCA RCA 
Commodity: Total Electricity Direct-Use Electricity Direct-Use 
Estimated short-run coefficients 
lnp, 'k 
-0.0973*** -0.0536*** -0.0250 -0.0624*** -0.0069 
l,j, ,I (0.0148) (0.0181) (0.0237) (0.0087) (0.0193) 
lnpOPi,1 
0.0398 -0.0404 0.0472 0.0975 0.2933** 
(0.0704) (0.1302) (0.1927) (0.0759) (0.1286) 
InY;,1 0.2426*** 0.2672*** 0.1887* 0.2037*** 0.0372 (0.0602) (0.0543) (0.1073) (0.0514) (0.0456) 
-0.0018 -0.0078*** -0.0047 -0.0040* 0.0008 
Yi,t (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
hddi~1 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0014** 0.0017*** 0.0053*** (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Kil 0.4261 *** 0.5276*** 0.5561 *** 0.0219 0.1873** 
(0.0571) (0.1000) (0.1209) (0.0558) (0.0889) 
lnE. 'k 1 0.7698*** 0.8103*** 0.7719*** 0.8281 *** 0.7270*** !,j, ,1- (0.0459) (0.0473) (0.0520) (0.0221) (0.0400) 
Implied long-run coefficients 
In Pi,j,k,t -0.4226 -0.2840 -0.1098 -0.3631 -0.0252 
InpoPi,t 0.1729 -0.2129 0.2070 0.5670 1.0745 
In 1';,t 1.0540 1.4082 0.8245 1.2059 0.1365 
Yi,t -0.0078 -0.0414 -0.0204 -0.0236 0.0031 
hddi:t 0.0034 -0.0031 0.0060 0.0101 0.0193 
Y 
• max 135,522*** 34,038*** 40,444*** 51,067*** nla 
WithinR2 0.9395 0.9207 0.6961 0.9711 0.7414 
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Recall regressors Yi,1 and hddi~t are income per capita defided by 1000 and heating degree days divided by 
1000 then squared, repectively. Reported significance of Y 'max is with respect to the joint significance of 
total GDP, GDP per capita and capital utilization. 
*, **, *** Denote the statistic is significant at the 10%, %5 or 1 % level, respectively. 
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We test the appropriateness of disaggregating total energy consumption into the 
five energy commodity-sectors using a 2SLS-within F-test of equality of the parameters 
in the five models. The results are presented at the top of Table 11-7. Under the null 
hypothesis, the seven parameter estimates are individually and simultaneously equal, 
meaning our five energy commodity sectors can be pooled into one model of total energy 
consumption. Note that we are not testing that the seven coefficients are equal to a single 
value, rather each of the seven coefficients is equal to a single value across the five 
models. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies there are systematic differences in the 
demand for energy across the energy commodity-sectors. Distributed as F(28,249), the 
2SLS-within F-statistic is equal to 7.23. With a critical value of 1.80, we reject the 
hypothesis at the 1 % level. We conclude the five models of energy consumption by 
commodity and sector cannot be pooled into a single model of total energy consumption. 
Table 11-7: Poolability of commodity-sectors into one model of total energy demand 
Parameters: Null Hypothesis: Distribution: CVS%: CVl%: F-stat: 
/3n,j,k =/3n , Tfj,k,n 
All 8. =8 J,t Tfj,k F(28,249) 1.52 1.80 7.23*** 
(I-Yj,k)=(I-y) ,Tfj,k 
lnY,y,K fl.,j,k = fl. ' Tfj,k,n F(12,249) 1.79 2.25 8.49*** 
lnp /31,j,k = /31 Tfj,k F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 4.14*** 
In pop fl2,j,k = fl2 Tfj, k F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 1.02 
lnY /33,j,k = /33 Tfj, k F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 3.47*** 
y /34,j,k = /34 Tfj, k F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 1.64 
hdd 2 /35,j,k = /35 Tfj, k F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 10.47*** 
K 8j ,k = 8 Tfj,k F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 10.24*** 
lnEt _1 (l-Yk)=(l-y) ,Tfj,k }, F(4,249) 2.41 3.40 1.44 
* Denotes the statistic is significant at the 10% level. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
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Next, in an effort to understand how demand in the five energy commodity-
sectors differs, we test the equality of each parameter estimate individually but not 
simultaneously. The details are presented in Table 11-7. The seven 2SLS-within F-tests 
are distributed as F (4,249). The critical value is equal to 2.41 at the 1 % level and 3.40 
at the 5% level. 
In the first of these tests, the F-statistic for the equality of the coefficient on 
lagged consumption is equal to 1.44. Therefore, the lagged nature of energy consumption 
does not appear to vary statistically by commodity-sector. Moreover, while (1- Yj,k) is 
statistically less than 1 for each energy commodity-sector, the result that (1- Yj,k) > 0.7 
suggests the majority of contemporaneous demand is a function of lagged demand (i.e. 
capital stock) rather than the long run equilibrium implied by contemporaneous factors. 
The coefficients on population are also statistically equal across the five models 
of energy commodity-sector consumption. 50 The 2SLS-within F-statistic for joint 
equality is equal 1.03. As shown in Table 11-6, RCA direct-use fuel demand is the only 
commodity-sector in which population is statistically significant and greater than zero. 
The F-statistic for the equality of the coefficient on price in all five commodity-
sectors is equal to 4.14, and we conclude that price elasticity varies statistically in the five 
50 We also estimated a per capita energy demand model, similar to the model specified by Medlock and 
Soligo (2001) with unsatisfactory results. The 2SLS-within per capita model we estimated was 
Inee=a. + .In .. + In.+ In. + hdd+o.K+l-. Inee ( ) 2 2 () 
',I l,}.k,1 PI,J,k P"J,k.t P2 Y"t P3 Y"t P4 1,1 j,k 1,1 Yiok i,j.k.l-1 
In this specification, if /32.j.k > 0 and /33.j.k < 0 then the energy demand is maximized at an income level 
equal to Y:.k = exp(/32.j.k /- 2/33.j.k)' Although fJ2,j,k was found to be at least weakly significant in each 
energy commodity-sector model, fJ3,j,k was significantly less than zero in only the per capita industrial 
electricity demand model. However, we did find 0j,k to be significantly greater than zero which supports 
the inclusion of capital utilization parameter in our model. 
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commodity-sectors. The short-run coefficient on price, shown in Table II-6, is 
significantly less than zero in transportation energy use and industrial and RCA 
electricity. However, the parameter estimate is not significant in the demand for direct-
use fuel in either the industrial or RCA sector. Recall that in these sectors a portion of 
demand is derived from space heating. These results suggest that the demand for heating 
is inelastic with respect to price. Demand in the industrial sector is also derived from 
using direct-use fuel in the production of goods. If the input price of energy is passed on 
to the consumers of the finished products, industrial producers may be indifferent to the 
price of direct-use fuels. 
Furthermore, the demand derived from space-heating is not equal across the five 
commodity-sectors. As shown in Table II-7, the F-statistic is equal to 10.47. In Table 
II-6, the short run coefficient on heating degree days squared is not significant for either 
transportation· fuel use or industrial electricity consumption. The coefficient on heating 
degree days squared, however, is significantly greater than zero at the 1 % level for both 
electricity and direct-use fuel consumption in the RCA sector and at the 5% level for 
direct-use fuels in the industrial sector. Holding all else constant, we conclude that 
energy consumption - and likely annual variation -will be greater in these three sectors 
for cold climates nations. 
It remains to test the equality of the three income variables - total GDP, GDP per 
capita and the capital utilization. As discussed above, we found the rate of adjustment to 
the long run equilibrium to be statistically equal in the five models. However, short run 
deviations from the long run equilibrium are also a function of capital utilization in our 
model. We reject the hypothesis that §j,k is equal in each energy commodity-sector at 
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the 1 % level with a 2SLS-with F-statistic equal to 10.24. The estimates of 8j ,k are 
highest in the industrial sector for both commodities, followed by the transportation 
sector and direct-use fuel demand in the RCA sector. However, 8. k is insignificant for j, 
electricity demand in the RCA sector. Therefore, deviations from the long run GDP 
growth rate have the biggest impact on energy intensity in the industrial and 
transportation sectors, respectively. 
In the long and short run, total GDP and GDP per capita capture the relationship 
between energy demand and economic growth. Differences in this relationship will 
cause /33,j,k and /34,j,k to vary statistically by sector j and commodity k. The 2SLS-with 
F-statistics for the equality of the coefficients individually across all five models are 3.47 
for total GDP and 1.64 for GDP per capital. Thus we reject the hypothesis that /33,j,k is 
equal in all five energy commodity-sectors but not /34,j,k • 
For the consumption of electricity, it can be shown that b3 . k > 0 and b4 . k < 0 in 
,j, ,j, 
both the industrial and RCA sectors. Therefore, long run income elasticity of electricity 
demand is initially positive but decreases with GDP per capita, resulting in a non-
monotonic relationship between economic development and electricity consumption. 
From equation (11-8) electricity demand is maximized at $34,038 and $51,067 in the long 
run in the industrial and RCA sectors, respectively. 
Although the coefficient on GDP per capita in Table 11-6 is not significant for 
transportation or direct-use fuel consumption in the industrial or RCA sectors, the point 
estimates are negative. From these point estimates, energy demand is maximized with 
respect to GDP per capita at $135,522 in the transportation sector and $40,444 in the 
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industrial sector for direct-use fuel. The parameter estimate for GDP per capita is 
positive, although not statistically greater than zero, in RCA direct-use fuel consumption, 
and income elasticity is equal to zero at an income level equal to -$44,184. However, 
this would be the point at which demand is minimized with respect to income. Therefore, 
the evidence suggests income elasticity of RCA direct-use fuel consumption is not strictly 
decreasing over the relevant income range. 
Finally, we test whether the three income variables are jointly equal across the 
five models of energy demand. The 2SLS-with F-test is distributed as F(12,249) and 
yields a test statistic equal to 8.49, which far exceeds the 1 % critical value of 2.26. We 
therefore conclude that economic development impacts energy demand differently across 
the five energy sector-commodities. 
To illustrate the varying relationship between economic development and energy 
demand in the five commodity-sectors, Figure 11-13 plots simulated paths of per capita 
energy consumption by commodity-sector as a function of GDP per capita for a 
hypothetical country using the parameter estimates presented in Table 11-6. The intercept 
for each commodity-sector is the sample average of the country-specific intercept. 
Annual heating degree days are assumed to equal the sample average of 4,274 in each 
year. Population and the real energy price index in each commodity-sector are also held 
constant at 1,000,000 people and 1002000 dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity, 
respectively. For each-commodity sector, two simulated demand paths are presented. 
The first, shown as a solid line, represents the demand path where GDP per capita grows 
at a constant rate equal to the sample average of 2.15% per year. In contrast, the demand 
path shown in hollow circles includes the impact of capital utilization where GDP per 
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capita is allowed to grow at a random rate with a mean of 2.15% and standard deviation 
of 3.38%.51 The variation between the two scenarios represents the impact of changing 
capital utilization. 
Figure 11-13: Simulated energy consumption for a hypothetical country 
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As shown in Figure 11-13, demand is maximized (and income elasticity equals 
zero) at per capita income levels of $34,038 and $40,444 respectively in the industrial 
sector for electricity and direct-fuel, which is lower than in the RCA and transportation 
sectors. Moreover, the impact of changing capital utilization appears greatest in 
transportation and industrial direct-use fuel demand. This is consistent with the results of 
presented in Table 11-6 where J1nd,k > J Tran > JRCA,k' The remainder of this section 
51 Note that total GDP grows at an anverage annual rate of 3.28% with a standard deviation of 3.49% in the 
pooled sample, The mean annual population growth rate is equal to 1.10% with a standard deviation of 
0.84%, 
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compares the relationship between energy demand and economic development by sector 
and then by commodity. 
Comparison of Demand by Sector 
Equation (11-5) can be used to generate the three long run models of demand by 
sector. Industrial sector energy demand is simply the sum of industrial electricity and 
direct-use fuel consumption. 
EI*ntI· =EI*ntlE' +EI*dD' 
,l,t , ,l,t n , ,l,t 
= A . p~'lnd'E. pop~.lnd'Eyb:J'lnd'E exp(y. )b4.lnd ,E exp(hdd~ )bs.lnd,E 
Ind,E,I,t IntI,E,I,t I,t I,t I,t I,t (11-18) 
+A . p~.lnd'D. pop~.lnd'Dyb:J'lnd'D exp(y. )b4.lnd ,D exp(hdd~ )bs.lnd,D 
IntI,D,I,t Ind,D,l,t I,t I,t I,t I,t 
Similarly, RCA energy demand is the sum of RCA consumption of electricity and direct-
use fuel. 
E;CA,i,t = E;CA,E,i,t + E;CA,D,i,t 
= A . P ~,RCA,E. pop ~2,RCA,E yb:J,RCA,E exp( y. ) b4,RCA,E exp( hdd ~ ) bS,RCA,E 
RCA,E,!,t RCA,E,I,t I,t !,t !,t !,t (11-19) 
+ A . p~'RCA'D. pOp~2'RCA'Dyb:J'RCA'D exp(y. )b4,RCA,D exp(hdd~ )bS,RCA,D 
RCA,D,I,t RCA,D,l,t I,t I,t I,t !,t 
Finally, transportation fuel demand follows directly from equation (11-5). 
• ~. b ~- b 2 b E . = A . p"l,Tmn. pop. 2,TmnY,,],Tran exp(y. ) 4,Tran exp(hdd. ) 5,Tr .. 
Tran,l,t ''Tran,l,t Tran,l,t I,t I,t I,t I,t (11-20) 
The long run income elasticity of transportation fuel demand is described by 
equation (11-8). However, the long run income elasticity of energy demand in the 
industrial sector is the share-weighted elasticity of demand by commodity. Specifically, 
E* *y E* *y 
c*y - Ind,E,i,tClntI,E,i,t + Ind,D,i,tClntI,D,i,t 
Ind,i,t E* 
Ind,i,t 
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The income level at which the long run elasticity of demand equals zero is also a function 
of the commodity weights. Cancelling total industrial energy demand, E;OO,i,t' from both 
the numerator and denominator, 
'max -( E;OO,E,i,tb 3,1OO,E + E;nd,D,i,tb 3,1oo,D) 
Ylnd,i,t = E' b + E* b • 
Ind,E,i,t 4,1OO,E Ind,D,i,t 4,1nd,D 
Because b 3,1nd,E > 0, b 3,1oo,D > 0, b 4,1oo,E < 0 and b 4,1nd,D < 0 in Table 11-6, Y;nd i maximizes 
the long run equilibrium demand for energy in the industrial sector. Moreover, because 
'max 'max th *max > 'max d *max < *max Th . d . I d d . 
Ylnd,E ::::;; Ylnd,D' en Yloo,i,t - Ylnd,E an Ylnd,i,t - YIOO,D • us, m ustria eman IS 
maximized between $34,038 and $40,444, and the higher the share of electricity demand 
in the industrial sector, the lower Y;':~t falls within this range. 
Similarly, the long run income elasticity of RCA energy demand is equal to 
E' 'Y E* *y 
c*y - RCA,E,i,tCRCA,E,i,t + RCA,D,i,tCRCA,D,i,t 
RCA,i,t E* 
RCA,i,t 
and 
, - ( E;CA,E,i,tb 3,RCA,E + E;CA,D,i,tb 3,RCA,D ) 
YRCA,i,t = E' b E* b • 
RCA,E,i,t 4,RCA,E + RCA,D,i,t 4,RCA,D 
In Table 11-6 b 3,RCA,E > 0, b 3,RCA,D > 0 and b 4,RCA,E < 0 but b 4,RCA,D > O. Thus Y;CA,i,t 
maximizes demand only if E;CA,E,i,tb4,RCA,E + E;CA,D,i,tb4,RCA,D < 0, i.e. if the share of 
electricity demand in the RCA sector exceeds 12%. 
The simulated demand paths for a hypothetical country in Figure 11-13 can be 
used to compare demand by sector. Figure 11-14 plots total energy consumption in the 
industrial, RCA and transportation sectors. The solid line represents the long run 
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equilibrium demand path where real GDP per capita grows at a constant rate of 2.15% 
per year. Figure 11-14 illustrates that the pattern of economic development and energy 
demand in our hypothetical country is consistent with the theories of saturation and 
dematerialization, particularly in the transportation and industrial sectors. Although the 
share of demand is initially largest in the RCA sector, demand in the industrial sector 
grows rapidly during early stages of economic development. Because demand growth is 
steady but fairly low in the RCA sector, the share of industrial sector demand quickly 
becomes the largest share of total energy demand at approximately $1,100 in our 
hypothetical country. However, by roughly $38,000 industrial sector demand peaks and 
growth of the transportation sector propels it to be the largest share of total energy 
demand. Moreover, transportation sector demand growth continues until demand is 
maximized near $135,522 which is beyond the income range in our sample. 
Figure 11-14: Simulated demand by sector for a hypothetical country 
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As mentioned previously, industrial demand peaks at an income level, Y;n':x, near 
$38,000. Because electricity demand comprises only a small share of industrial 
electricity consumption (approximately 22%) in our hypothetical country, y;,:ax is closer 
to the high end of the range (Y;n7.~u = $40,444) than the lower end of the range 
(Y;n~~x = $34,032). In contrast, total energy demand in the RCA sector does not peak for 
our hypothetical country over any relevant GDP per capita range. Although electricity 
demand in the sector peaks at an income of $50,067 in Figure 11-13, the share of 
electricity demand is small. The growth of RCA direct use fuel demand dominates any 
electricity demand loss beyond $50,067, causing demand in the RCA sector to continue 
to grow. 
Allowing real GDP growth to vary annually (with mean of 2.15% and standard 
deviation of 3.38%) results in the demand path represented by hollow circles in Figure 
11-13. The deviation from the long run equilibrium demand path illustrates the impact of 
changing capital utilization in each sector. Figure 11-14 illustrates that the impacts of 
capital utilization are modest in the RCA sector. However, significant deviations in the 
short run from the long run equilibrium are present in both the transportation and 
industrial sectors. This is consistent with increasing capital utilization causing short-term 
increases in energy intensity. Assuming both labor and energy are variable inputs, then 
less efficient capital stock and additional employees will be used to increase output, 
resulting in more transportation of the workforce and finished goods. 
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Comparison of Electricity and Direct-Use Fuel Demand 
Equation (11-5) can also be used to generate long run models of electricity and 
direct -use fuel demand, as well as a model of total energy consumption. Electricity 
demand is the sum of electricity consumption in the industrial and RCA sectors. 
EE*' = El* dE' + ER*C" E . 
• l.t n • • l.t ..... • l.t 
= A . p'>1.lnd.E. POp~.Ind.Ey~.Ind.E exp(y. )b4.Ind.E exp(hdd 2 )bs.1nd .E 
IOO.E.l.t IOO.E.l.t l.t l.t l.t l.t (11-21) 
+A . p'>1.RCA.E pOp~·RCA.Ey~.RCA.E exp(y. )b4.RCA.E exp(hdd~ /S.RCA.E 
RCA.E.l.t RCA.E.l.t l.t l.t l.t l.t 
Direct-use fuel demand is the sum of transportation fuel and industrial and RCA direct-
use fuel consumption. 
ED*' = El*OO D' + ER*C" D' + ET* . 
,t,t • ,l,t 1'1., ,l,t ran,l,t 
= A . pb.,.Ind .D. pop~.Ind.Dy~.Ind.D exp(y. )b4.Ind.D exp(hdd? )bS.Ind.D 
Ind.D.l.t IOO.D.l.t l.t l.t l.t l.t 
+A . pb.,.RCA.D. pOp~·RCA.Dy~.RCA.D exp(y. )b4.RCA.D exp(hdd~ )bs.RCA .D 
RCA.D.l.t RCA.D.l.t l.t l.t l.t l.t 
(11-22) 
+ A . pb.,.Tran. pop~·Trany~.Tran exp(y. )b4.Tran exp(hdd~ )bs.Tran 
.I. ~ran.l,t Tran,l,! l,t l,t l,t l,t 
Finally, total energy demand is the sum of electricity and direct-use fuel in each of the 
three sectors. 
E~t = El* dE' + ER*c" E' + El*OO D' + ER*c" D' + E; '. I, n • ,l,t £1.., ,l,t , ,l,t 11., ,l,t I. ran,l,t (11-23) 
The long run elasticity of electricity demand is equal to the share-weighted 
elasticity of electricity demand by sector. 
E* *y E* *y 
C*Y - Ind.E.i.tC/OO.E.i.t + RCA.E.i.tCRCA.E.i.t 
E.i.t - E* 
E,i.t 
The income level at which the long run elasticity of electricity demand equals zero is 
* -( E;OO.E.i.tb3./OO.E + E;CA.E.i.tb3.RCA.E) 
y E.i.t = E* b + E* b . 
IOO.E.i.t 4,1nd.E RCA.E.i.t 4.RCA.E 
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* 
Because b 4,lnd,E > 0, b 3,RCA,E > 0, b 4,lnd,E < 0 and b 4,RCA,E < 0 in Table II-6, YE,i,t 
maximizes the long run equilibrium demand for energy in the industrial sector. 
'max *max d *max < *max Th . d . I d d . .. d Moreover, YE,i,t :2: Ylnd,E an YE,i,t - YRCA,E' us, III ustna eman IS maXImIze 
between $34,038 and $50,067, and the higher the share of electricity demand by the 
industrial sector, the lower Y~~~tX falls within this range. 
Similarly, the long run income elasticity of direct-use fuel demand is equal to 
E* *y E* *y E* *y 
coy = Ind,D,i,tClnd,D + RCA,D,i,tCRCA,D + Tran,i,tCTran 
D,i,t E* 
i,t 
Also, 
( * * *) * - E 1nd ,D,i,tb 3,lnd,D + E RCA ,D,i,tb 3,RCA,D + ETran,i,tb3,Tran 
YD,i,t = 
In Table II-6 b 3 Ind D > 0, b 3 RCA D > 0, b 3 Tran > 0, b 4Ind D < 0 and b 4 T an < 0 but b 4 RCA D > 0 . , • " , , , , r , , 
Thus Y;,i,t maximizes demand only if E;nd,D,i,tb 4,lnd,D + E;CA,D,i,tb4,RCA,D + E;ran,i,tb4,Tran < o. 
Finally, the long run income elasticity of total energy demand is equal to 
E* *y E* *y E* *y E* *y E* *y 
coy - Ind,D,i,tClnd.D + Ind,E,i,tClnd,E + RCA E I tCRCA,E + RCA,D,i,tCRCA,D + Tran,i,tCTran 
D,;,t - E* 
i,t 
and 
( * * * * *) 
* - E 1nd ,E,i,tb3,lnd,E + E 1nd ,D,i,tb 3,lnd,D + E RCA ,E,i,tb 3,RCA,E + E RCA ,D.i,tb 3,RCA,D + E Tran ,i,tb3,Tran 
YD,i,t = 
is the income level which equates the long run elasticity of energy demand to zero. Y;,;,t 
maximizes total energy demand only if the denominator is less than zero. 
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The simulated demand paths for a hypothetical country presented in Figure 11-13 
are used to compare demand by commodity and to analyze total energy demand. Figure 
II-IS plots total energy consumption in the industrial, RCA and transportation sectors. 
The solid line represents the long run equilibrium demand path where real GDP per 
capita grows at a constant rate of 2.15 % per year. Allowing real GDP growth to vary 
annually (with mean of 2.15% and standard deviation of 3.38%) results in the demand 
path represented by hollow circles. The deviation from the long run equilibrium demand 
path illustrates the impact of changing capital utilization in each sector. 
Figure 11-15: Simulated energy demand by commodity for a hypothetical country 
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In Figure II-IS , the simulated paths of electricity and direct-use fuel demand are 
each consistent with the theories of saturation and dematerialization. Electricity demand 
grows rapidly during early states of economic development. However, once income per 
capita reaches approximately $36,000, demand for electricity in our hypothetical country 
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begins to fall. Direct-use fuel consumption also exhibits a non-monotonic relationship 
with economic development. Recall that direct -use demand is maximized in the 
industrial sector at $50,067 and $135,522 in the transportation sector. However, RCA 
direct-use fuel demand continues to grow with economic development over any relevant 
income range. The decrease in industrial direct-use fuel consumption eventually 
outweighs demand growth in both the RCA and transportation sectors, causing direct-use 
fuel demand in our hypothetical country to be maximized at approximately $100,000 per 
capita. 52 This leads us to conclude that the impacts of dematerialization and saturation 
are stronger for electricity than direct-use fuel, causing electricity demand to be 
maximized at a significantly lower income level than direct-use fuel. Moreover, because 
the share of direct-use fuel in our hypothetical country dwarfs that of electricity demand, 
total energy demand is not maximized until an income level of approximately $82,000. 
Although direct-use fuel takes a greater share of demand than electricity in both 
the RCA and industrial sector during all stages of development in our hypothetical 
country, we find that the long run elasticity of demand, £;Y, to be initially greater than 
the income elasticity of demand for direct-use fuels, £;Y, i.e. £;Y <£;}'. This suggests 
that as an economy begins to develop, significant investments are made in electricity 
transmission and distribution to capture from economics of scale created from using a 
large generator to convert direct-use fuel into electricity. This allows electricity demand 
in the industrial and RCA sectors to grow rapidly. However, once income reaches 
approximately $20,000 and transportation becomes the largest share of demand by 
52 Although energy demand in the transportation sector peaks at $135,522 per capita in our hypothetical 
country, income elasticity in the sector is still positive around $100,000. Thus the fall in industrial direct-
use demand must offset the growth in demand from both the RCA and transportation sectors near 
$100,000. 
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commodity-sector, the long run income elasticity of demand for direct-use fuel becomes 
greater than the income elasticity of electricity, i.e. E;Y < E;Y. This is consistent with 
differing physical characteristics and the current state of technology which prevent 
electricity from being a perfect substitute for direct-use fuel, particularly in the 
transportation sector. 
j. Conclusions 
In modeling energy consumption by commodity and sector for 50 countries, we 
find the relationship between energy consumption and economic development 
corresponds to the structure of aggregate output and the nature of derived demand for 
electricity and direct-use fuels in each sector. Notably, the evidence of non-constant 
income elasticity of demand is much greater for electricity demand than for direct-use 
fuel consumption. In addition, we show that during periods of rapid economic 
development, one in which the short-term growth rate exceeds the long-run average, an 
increase in aggregate output is met by less energy-efficient capital. This is a result of 
capital being fixed in the short-term. As additional, more efficient capital stock is added 
to the production process, the short-term increase in energy intensity will diminish. 
k. References 
Adkins, L.C. and R.C. Hill (2008). Using Statafor Principles of Econometrics. 3rd ed. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Ahn, S. and P. Schmidt (1995). "Efficient Estimation of Models for Dynamic Panel 
Data." Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 5-27. 
Anderson, T. and C. Hsiao (1981). "Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error 
Components." Journal of American Statistical Associations, 76: 598-606. 
Anderson, T. and C. Hsiao (1982). "Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models 
Using Panel Data." Journal of Econometrics, 18: 67-82. 
80 
Ang, B.W. (1987). "A Cross-Sectional Analysis of Energy-Output Correlation." Energy 
Economics, 9 (4): 274-286. 
Ang, B.W. (1988). "Electricity-Output Ratio and Sectoral Electricity Use." Energy 
Policy, 16(2): 115-121. 
Arellano, M (1987). "Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-Groups 
Estimators." Oxford Bulletin of Economics & Statistics, 49(4): 431-434. 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carol Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations." Review of 
Economic Studies, 58(2), 277-297. 
Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995). "Another Look at Instrumental Variables Estimation 
of Error Components Models." Journal of Econometrics, 68: 29-51. 
Balestra, P. and M. Nerlove (1966). "Pooling Cross Setction and Time Series Data in the 
Estimation of a Dynamic Model: The Demand for Natural Gas." Econometrica, 
34(3): 585-612. 
Baltagi, B.H. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 4th ed. Chichester, UK: 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Baltagi, B.H. and J.M. Griffin (1997). "Pooled Estimators vs. Their Heterogeneous 
Counterparts in the Context of Dynamic Demand for Gasoline." Journal of 
Econometrics, 77: 303-327. 
Baltagi, B and Q. Li (1991). "A Joint Hypothesis Test for Serial Correlation for Serial 
Correlation and Random Individual Effects." Statistics & Probability Letter, 11: 
277-280. 
Bernardini, o. and R. Galli (1993). "Dematerialization: Long-Term Trends in the 
Intensity of Use of Materials and Energy." Futures, (May): 431-448. 
Breusch, T.S. and A.R. Pagan (1980). "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its 
Applications to Model Specification in the Presence of Local Misspecification." 
Review of Economic Studies, 47: 239-253. 
Brookes, L.G. (1973). "More on the Output Elasticity of Energy Consumption." Journal 
of Industrial Economics, (April): 83-94. 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1988). "Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models." Journal of Econometrics, 84(1): 115-143. 
81 
Chenery, H. B. and M. Syrquin (1975). Patterns of Development, 1950-1970. London: 
Oxford Press. 
Darrat, A.F., O.W. Gilley, and DJ. Meyer (1996). "US Oil Consumption, Oil Prices, and 
the Macroeconomy." Empirical Economics, 21: 317-334. 
Ferguson, R., W. Wilkinson and R. Hill (2000). "Electricity Use and Economic 
Development." Energy Policy 28: 923-934. 
Galli, R. (1998). "The Relationship between Energy Intensity and Income Levels: 
Forecasting Long Term Energy Demand in Asian Emerging Countries." The 
Energy Journal, (19)4: 85-105. 
Green, W.H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. 5th ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Hankinson, G.A. and J.H.W. Rhys (1983). "Electricity Consumption, Electricity 
Intensity and Industrial Structure." Energy Economics, 5 (3): 146-152. 
Hsiao, C. (1986). Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press. 
Judson, R.A., R. Schmalensee and T.M. Stoker (1999). "Economic Development and the 
Structure of the Demand for Commercial Energy." The Energy Journal, (20)2: 
29-57. 
Koyck, L.M. (1954). Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis. Amsterdam: North 
Holland Publishing. 
Kuznets, S. (1971). Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production 
Structure. Cambridge, MA: The Belnapp Press of Harvard University. 
Medlock III, K.B. and R. Soligo (2001). "Economic Development and End-Use Energy 
Demand." The Energy Journal, (22)2: 77-105. 
Moroney, J.R. (1992). "Energy, Capital, and Growth" in Advances in the Economics of 
Energy and Resources, Volume 7: 189-204. 
Nilsson, LJ. (1993). "Energy Intensity Trends in 31 Industrial and Developing Countries 
1950-1988." Energy, 18 (4): 309-322. 
StataCorp (2007). Stata Longitudinal/Panel-Data Reference Manual: Release 10. 
College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. 
StataCorp (2007). Stata Statistical Software: Release 9. College Station, TX: StataCorp 
LP. 
Stem, D. (1993). "Energy Use and Economic Growth in the USA, A Multivariate 
Approach." Energy Economics, 15: 137-150. 
82 
Stem, D (2000). "A Multivariate Co integration Analysis on the Role of Energy in the US 
Macroeconomy." Energy Economics, 15: 267-283. 
Wolde-Rufael, Y. (2006). "Electricity Consumption and Economic Growth: a Time 
Series Experience for 17 African Countries." Energy Policy: 34: 1006-1114. 
Wooldride, J. (1990). "A Note on the Lagrange Multiplier and F-Statistics for Two Stage 
Least Squares Regressions." Economics Letters, 34: 151-155. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Zilberfarb, B.Z. and F.G. Adams (1981). "The Energy-GDP Relationship in Developing 
Countries." Energy Economics, 3: 244-248. 
III. Essay 3 - Florida Vehicle Fuel Demand Decomposed into Vehicle Miles 
Traveled and Fuel Efficiency 
a. Introduction 
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In this paper, we develop a system of equations to estimate a model of motor 
vehicle fuel consumption, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel efficiency for the 67 
counties of the State of Florida from 2001 to 2008. This procedure allows us to 
decompose the factors of fuel demand into elasticities of vehicle driving demand and fuel 
efficiency. Particular attention is paid to the influence of the price of fuel, the sale of 
goods and services, vehicle ownership and population density on each component of our 
model. 
In summary, we find that an increase in the price of fuel results in a short and 
long-run decrease in fuel demand but not through a decrease in vehicle miles traveled. 
Instead we find evidence that a price increase leads to an increase in fuel efficiency. We 
also find that the value of goods sold is positively correlated with vehicle fuel demand as 
consumers likely increase vehicle miles traveled to acquire more goods. However, this 
has no significant impact on vehicle fuel efficiency. In addition, we find that an increase 
in the share of vehicle ownership does not result in an increase in vehicle miles traveled 
in our sample. Alternatively, a decrease in vehicle fuel efficiency causes vehicle fuel 
demand to increase. Finally, an increase in population density decreases vehicle miles 
traveled but the vehicle fuel savings is offset by 65% in the short-run, and 35% in the 
long-run, by a loss of fuel efficiency. 
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b. Determinants of Vehicle Fuel Demand 
Refined petroleum products, gasoline and diesel fuel, are the main energy inputs 
into the production of personal and commercial transportation services.53 Generally, a 
household or individual will maximize utility gained from consuming goods and services 
where transportation is an inputs into the household production function. 54 The 
production function therefore determines the indirect demand for fuel subject to the wage 
rate, time spent driving, the technology used to convert fuel into distance traveled and the 
price of fuel and all other goods and services. Because fuel demand (measured in 
gallons) is simply the outcome of vehicle miles traveled divided by vehicle fuel 
efficiency (measured in miles per gallon), it is possible to decompose vehicle fuel 
demand into the demand for vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. This form of fuel 
demand model is described in detail in section c. First, however, we identify several 
factors that are likely to influence Florida residents' driving demand and fuel efficiency. 
Price, Economic Activity and Vehicle Ownership 
As alluded to above, it is standard to assume gasoline consumption is a function 
of income and price; and studies generally find estimates of price elasticity to be negative 
53 According to the EIA, the use of alternative fuels such as compressed natural gas and electricity 
accounted for less than 0.23% of total vehicle fuel consumed in the United States in 2007. Gasoline and 
diesel (and additives) account for the remaining vehicle fuel consumed. Note that a single engine generally 
cannot use multiple fuel types. Thus, gasoline and diesel are substitutes only in the long-run. Also, one 
gallon of diesel has a higher heat content (approximately 139,000 btu/gallon) than gasoline (approximately 
124,000 btu/gallon). Unless otherwise stated, all volumes have been converted to gallon of gasoline 
equivalent where 1 gallon of diesel is equal to 1.12 gallons of gasoline. 
54 A thorough review of this utility framework can be found in Sterner and Dahl (1992). Other examples 
include Puller and Greening (1999) and Mehta et al (1978). An alternative specification would include an 
individual maximizing utility gained from consuming goods and transportation subject to income and 
prices of vehicle fuel and all other goods and services. 
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and income elasticity to be positive. 55 In a review of 97 studies, Dahl and Sterner (1991) 
report the short and long-run price elasticity estimates average -0.26 and -0.86, 
respectively, whereas the short and long-run income elasticity estimates average 0.48 and 
1.38, respectively. Epsey (1998) finds similar results in a review of 101 gasoline demand 
studies. Specifically, the 363 short-run and 277 long-run price elasticity estimates 
average -0.26 and -0.58, respectively. The 345 short-run and 245 long-run income 
elasticity estimates average 0.47 and 0.88, respectively. Espey (1998) also concludes that 
the elasticity estimates are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of vehicle ownership 
and fuel efficiency. In general, excluding these variables produces more elastic estimates 
for price and income. 
In the context of a fuel demand model decomposed into vehicle miles traveled 
and fuel efficiency, a driver can respond to a change in the price of fuel by altering 
vehicle miles traveled. This is a result of the fact that vehicle fuel is an input and 
represents a cost in the consumer's transportation decision. For example, if the price of 
gasoline increases, an individual wanting to reduce gasoline expenses can substitute the 
use of his personal vehicle for public transportation (if available), carpool to work, reduce 
distance traveled by aggregating trips to several destinations into one (although this may 
reduce fuel efficiency) or eliminating less valuable travel such as driving vacations. 
Notice that these are predominately short-run responses. In the long-run he may move 
closer to work or change jobs to reduce the length of his commute for example. 
Vehicle fuel efficiency - the conversion of gallons of fuel into vehicle miles 
traveled - is not only a function of vehicle characteristics (engine technology, size, 
55 Models excluding price and income variables are considered mis-specified by Dahl and Sterner (1991), 
for example. 
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weight, etc.) but also a function of vehicle maintenance (tire pressure, regular oil 
changes, etc.) as well as driving conditions (traffic, speed, terrain, etc.). Thus, in the 
short-run where vehicle stocks are assumed to be fixed, a driver can reduce gasoline 
expenses by increasing the frequency of routine maintenance or altering his route to 
avoid roadway congestion and stop-and-go traffic. A driver may also reduce his driving 
speed to optimize engine performance, although this has the added cost of increasing 
driving time. Alternatively, in the case of a multi-vehicle household, the members may 
chose to reallocate the use of vehicles among themselves to minimize total fuel expenses. 
Finally, in the long-run, an individual can purchase a new vehicle with improved engine 
technology, reduce consumption of motor vehicle fuel and maintain the same quantity 
vehicle miles traveled. Note, however, there may be additional costs such as reduced 
comfort or safety. 
Using household survey data from the 1980s, Puller and Greening (1999) find the 
price elasticity of both gasoline consumption and vehicle miles to be negative. This is of 
no surprise. However, the authors also find the price elasticity of fuel efficiency 
(measured in miles per gallon) to be negative and suggest that households respond to 
higher gasoline prices by reducing high efficiency miles (such as the family vacation) 
rather than improving its vehicle stock or altering driving behavior. The same result may 
also be achieved if the household decides to combine several trips into one, resulting in 
fewer miles traveled. However, additional stops may reduce overall fuel efficiency. 
Income is thought to impact vehicle fuel demand in several ways. First, higher 
income is associated with a higher rate of vehicle ownership, a necessity for personal 
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vehicle transportation. 56 Thus, following Espey (1998), we explicitly include vehicle 
ownership in our model of vehicle fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel 
efficiency. A positive elasticity of demand for vehicle miles traveled will suggest, 
provided the household owns a vehicle, more demand for miles driven. However, a 
contrary effect might operate if vehicle ownership decreases fuel efficiency, for example 
because an increase in the number of vehicles on the road increases congestion and 
results in poorer engine performance. Another way this might happen would be if safety 
or roominess of the vehicle, for example, have positive income elasticities and vehicle 
safety and size are negatively correlated with vehicle fuel efficiency. Wage rates, and 
thus the opportunity cost of time, might provide another link between income and fuel 
efficiency. Individuals with a higher cost of time might substitute fuel for time by 
driving faster and thus purchase vehicles that can go faster even though they may be less 
fuel-efficient. 
Another issue is how one measures income at the aggregate level. Data on 
residents' median household income is available at the county level. Holding all else 
equal, an increase in household income implies an individual can afford to purchase more 
vehicle fuel. In the case of our study, however, Florida has a large retirement community 
and the use of household income data may not accurately capture fuel expenditures out of 
wealth. Alternatively, GDP per capita is often used. Here an increase in GDP per capita 
signals both an increase in income and an increase in economic activity, which could 
result in an increase in vehicle miles traveled as consumers purchase more goods and 
56 Examples of empirical work include Medlock and Soligo (2002) and Dargay, Gately and Sommer 
(2007). 
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services. 57 Furthermore, the use of GDP per capita at the county level would likely 
capture demand for transportation services by out-of-county residents such as tourists and 
commuters who spend money while in the county despite being a resident elsewhere. 
This is unlikely to be captured by using the median household income of all residents of 
the county. Unfortunately, GDP per capita data at the county level is not generally 
available. Instead we use county-level sales data, which is available by county in the 
State of Florida. 
Population Density 
Higher population density is likely to reduce demand for personal vehicle 
transportation. First, Stewart and Bennett (1975) suggest that residents of urban, more 
densely populated areas generally have greater access to public transportation, providing 
a substitute for personal vehicle transportation.58 Second, the distance an individual must 
travel when commuting to work, or running routine errands such as purchasing groceries, 
may be lower in larger urban areas with multiple shopping and employment centers.59 
Using 2008 Florida county-level data, Figure 111-1 plots the natural logarithm of 
population density against the natural logarithm of average daily vehicle miles traveled 
per resident.6o A visual inspection of the data reveals a strong negative correlation 
between population density and vehicle miles traveled. This is consistent with a review 
of the literature. 
57 For cross-country or long time-series data, higher per capita GDP or higher median household income 
may also be correlated with increased urbanization and access to better road conditions and infrastructure 
such as gas stations. Presumably, this further supports the correlation of income and driving demand. 
58 Also see Banister (1992) and Newman and Kenworthy (1989). 
59 Also see Ostro and Naroff (1980), Zelinsky and Sly (1984), and Bento et al (2005). 
60 The data is described in detail in section d. Varying marker colors are for illustration purposes only. The 
33 counties that do not comprise one of the 20 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the state are labeled 
in blue. Counties labeled in green have the highest population in the MSA, and all remaining counties are 
labeled in red. 
Figure III-I: Florida Daily Vehicle Miles Traveled per Resident 
and Density, 2008 
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Figure 111-3: Florida Daily Fuel Demand per Resident and Population Density, 2008 
c:: 
o 
~ 
Ql 
!l.. 
o 
o Liberty 
2 
Vehicle Fuel Demand and Density 2008 
o Madison 
(all data in natural logs) 
Gadsden 
o 
OHamilton OJackson 
OSumter 
o JefferSO~keeChObee 
OTaylor 8 o Columbia 
Walton 
o Monroe 
o Suwannee Marion 
FracSkJin Hegdry OSaker o Bradford cfOsceOla Duval 
Bay °0 Orange 
DixieO HoimesO OHardee Charl~:~ncP ~St Johns 
o Levy Okaloosa Indian A OHills.borougn N~au Santa'eosao 0 Pol' Escambl6Lee ' 
WashingtonO Putnamo AJacl1uaOHernandc:D OSt Lucie 
Calhoun OGilchristHighlands Semi ~e OOMa~~vard ' OBroward 
OGlades 0 CO!lI(!f LakEt~ono 0 Sa~sota OOade 
De80toO OUnian 0 0 ~layO Vo'usi8pascfoa,m Seadl PinellasO 
o Lafayette OGuif OWakuHa Flagler Citrus 
4 6 8 
People per Square Mile 
Stewart and Bennett also argue that road congestion and traffic tend to reduce fuel 
efficiency as density increases.61 In Figure 111-2, the natural logarithm of population 
density is plotted against the natural logarithm of implied vehicle fuel efficiency 
measured in miles per gallon. A visual inspection of data reveals there is a negative 
correlation between Florida population density and implied fuel efficiency. 
Therefore, in terms of the quantity of vehicle fuel consumed, the literature as well 
as the data suggests that the decrease in personal vehicle transportation as population 
density increases is at least partially offset by a loss of fuel efficiency. Empirical results 
from Sanghi (1976), Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan (1976) and Newman and 
Kenworthy (1989) indicate the offset is less than complete so that gasoline demand 
nevertheless decreases with population density. This conclusion is less straightforward, 
61AIso see Banister (1992). 
91 
however, in our analysis of vehicle fuel sales in Florida. See Figure II-8 which plots the 
natural logarithm of population density against the natural logarithm of the average 
number of gallons of fuel sold per county resident. In 2008 the county with the highest 
and lowest motor fuel sales per capita (Madison and Wakulla, respectively) are generally 
lower density counties. 
Although the literature on U.S. gasoline demand is quite mature, the majority of 
this research is focused on household, state or national-level consumption.62 There are a 
few exceptions, however, particularly from authors interested in analyzing the affect of 
population density on gasoline consumption using metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
data.63 Unfortunately, these studies exclude rural areas, which are an important segment 
of the distribution of population density. Furthermore, county-level gasoline demand 
data - which would include rural areas - is rare.64 A survey of available data by 
Zellinsky and Sly (1984) led the authors to believe that "no source, or combination of 
sources, provides a reasonable approximation of the amount of gasoline used for all 
purposes, and for personal transportation in particular, in the United States, by county, for 
1960 and 1970." 
By focusing on the 67 counties in the State of Florida, we are able to have a large 
sample size with a wide range of population densities. In 2008, population density in our 
sample spans from only 9.5 people per square mile in Liberty County to 3,250.9 people 
per square mile in Pinellas County. See 
Table III-l for a list of Florida counties, population, land area and density. 
62 See Table 2 and Table 3 in Espey (1998). 
63 Stewart and Bennett (1975) and Houthakker, Verlerger and Sheehan (1974), for example. 
64 In general we found states which grant counties the authority to tax gasoline are more likely to collect 
county-level gasoline sales data. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009) only 
Hawaii, Nevada and Florida grant this authority. 
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Table III-I: Florida counties, population, area and density 
County Population Land Area Density County Population Land Area Density 
people per people per 
count sq. miles sq. mile count sq. miles sq. mile 
Liberty 7,957 836 9.5 Flagler 91,247 485 188.1 
Glades 11,175 774 14.4 Okaloosa 179,693 936 192.0 
Lafayette 8,013 543 14.8 Osceola 263,676 1,322 199.5 
Franklin 11,202 544 20.6 Marion 329,628 1,579 208.8 
Taylor 21,546 1,042 20.7 Bay 163,946 764 214.6 
Dixie 14,957 704 21.2 Charlotte 150,060 694 216.2 
Calhoun 13,617 567 24.0 Citrus 141,416 584 242.2 
Jefferson 14,547 598 24.3 Santa Rosa 150,053 609 246.4 
Madison 18,895 692 27.3 Martin 138,660 556 249.4 
Hamilton 14,348 515 27.9 Indian River 132,315 503 263.1 
Gulf 15,667 555 28.2 Alachua 241,364 874 276.2 
Hendry 39,453 1,153 34.2 Clay 184,727 601 307.4 
Levy 39,460 1,118 35.3 Polk 580,594 1,874 309.8 
Holmes 19,328 483 40.0 St. Johns 181,540 572 317.4 
Washington 23,928 580 41.3 Lake 307,243 953 322.4 
Baker 26,164 585 44.7 Hernando 171,689 478 359.2 
Hardee 28,888 637 45.4 Leon 264,063 667 395.9 
Gilchrist 17,191 349 49.3 Seminole 410,854 1,017 404.0 
Walton 53,837 1,058 50.9 Manatee 315,766 741 426.1 
Wakulla 31,089 607 51.2 Vol usia 498,036 1,103 451.5 
Okeechobee 40,359 774 52.1 Escambia 302,939 662 457.6 
DeSoto 33,991 637 53.4 Brevard 536,521 1,018 527.0 
Jackson 49,656 916 54.2 Pasco 471,028 745 632.3 
Suwannee 39,802 688 57.9 Palm Beach 1,265,293 1,974 641.0 
Union 15,141 240 63.1 Sarasota 372,057 573 649.3 
Monroe 72,243 997 72.5 Lee 593,136 804 737.7 
Columbia 69,092 797 86.7 St. Lucie 265,108 308 860.7 
Gadsden 47,560 516 92.2 Duval 850,962 774 1,099.4 
Highlands 100,011 1,028 97.3 Hillsborough 1,180,784 1,051 1,123.5 
Bradford 29,012 293 99.0 Orange 1,072,801 908 1,181.5 
Putnam 73,459 722 101.7 Dade 2,398,245 1,946 1,232.4 
Nassau 69,835 652 107.1 Broward 1,751,234 1,205 1,453.3 
Sumter 74,721 546 136.9 Pinellas 910,260 280 3,250.9 
Collier 315,258 2,025 155.7 
The data is described in detail in section d. 
We are also able build upon the previous research by developing a system of 
equations to model motor vehicle fuel consumption per resident, vehicle miles traveled 
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per resident and implied vehicle fuel efficiency in the 67 counties in the State of Florida. 
Because we model total vehicle miles traveled, our vehicle fuel demand data must 
incorporate both gasoline and diesel fuel consumption. With this system of equations we 
are able to decompose fuel demand elasticity estimates into elasticities of demand for 
vehicle miles traveled and motor vehicle fuel efficiency, and analyze the ways various 
factors influence fuel demand. Particular attention is paid to price of vehicle fuel, 
economic activity, vehicle ownership and population density. 
c. Model of Fuel Demand, Vehicle Miles Traveled and Fuel Efficiency 
In this section, a dynamic system of structural equations for annual vehicle fuel demand 
(measured in gallons), annual personal vehicle transportation demand (measured in 
vehicle miles traveled) and fuel efficiency (measured in miles per gallon) is described in 
detail. 
Equation 1: Demand for Vehicle Fuel 
Our first equation describes demand for vehicle fuel directly and assumes the 
long-run equilibrium demand per resident measured in gallons ( g;t) is a function of the 
price of a gallon of fuel ( Pi,t ), gross sale of goods and services ( Si,t)' vehicles per 
resident (vi,t) and population density (di,t ) where i and t denote county and year, 
respectively. This can be written as 
g~ =f(p. ,So ,v. ,d.). l,t l,t 1,1 l,t 1,1 (111-1) 
We use a the following demand function assuming constant elasticity. 
g~ = .11 .p~.ll1.2/)1.3d~·4 
l,t ~~.l l,t l,t l,t l,t (111-2) 
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Taking the natural logarithm of (111-2) yields 
(111-3) 
where bl,k for k = 1, ... , 4 and cl +~,i = In~,i are parameters of the long-run equilibrium 
fuel demand equation. Note that cl is the common intercept where as ~,i is the county-
specific effect, which can be treated as either fixed or random. 
Responses to exogenous changes in our equation of fuel demand, however, are 
unlikely to occur in just one year.65 To capture both short and long-run responses, we use 
the partial adjustment model specified by Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan (1974) 
where the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is assumed to take the form 
(111-4) 
and /'1,1 is the adjustment factor which is bound between 0 and 1. 
Taking the natural logarithm of (111-4) and rearranging the terms yields 
(111-5) 
It is now obvious that if /'11 = 0 , the adjustment to long-run equilibrium never happens 
while if /'1,1 = 1, the adjustment is instantaneous. Substituting (111-3) into (111-5), the first 
equation of our dynamic system describing fuel demand is 
In gi,( = J4 + al,i + A,l ln Pi,( + A,2 1n Si,( + PI,3 In vi,( + PI,4 In di,( 
+ (1-/'1,1) In gi,t-I + ul,i,( 
(111-6) 
65 In a survey of over one hundred studies of the short and long-run elasticities of gasoline demand, Dahl 
and Sterner (1991) find that "static models tend to underestimate long-run adjustments to price changes but 
not necessarily to income changes." 
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where the short-run parameter estimates, A,k = YJ,lbl,k for k = 1, ... ,4, J.l,. = /'I,ICI and 
al,i = /'I,lll:t,i' can be used to recover the long-run parameter estimates, al,k' bl,k and c1 . 
Equation 2: Demand for Vehicle Miles Traveled 
The above approach is largely consistent with dynamic models of gasoline 
demand analyzed in surveys by Dahl and Sterner (1991) and Espey (1998). However, 
fuel demand can also be dis aggregated into its components - vehicle miles traveled and 
fuel efficiency - to analyze elasticity estimates separately.66 
Given fuel demand in equation 1 is implicitly derived from demand for vehicle 
transportation, we assume the long-run equilibrium demand for vehicle miles traveled per 
capita, mi,t' takes a similar constant elasticity log-linear form. Specifically, 
(111-7) 
The dynamic nature of vehicle transportation demand is captured by a partial adjustment 
process similar to (111-4), where 
(111-8) 
and 
(111-9) 
Substituting (111-7) into (111-9), the dynamic equation for vehicle miles traveled in our 
system is 
66 Examples include Dahl (1979), Archibald and Gillingham (1981) and Greening and Puller (1999). In 
Espey (1998), the author analyzes 277 short-run and 363 long-run models of gasoline demand of which 7 
and 13, respectively, use an indirect approach where driving, vehicle ownership and fuel efficiency are 
analyzed separately. 
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In mi,t = f.12 + a 2,i + 132,1 In Pi,t + 132,2 In Si,t + 132,3 In vi,( + 132,4 In di,t 
+ (1- Y2,2) In mi,t_' + u2,i,t (lII-lO) 
where 132 k = Y2 2b2 k for k = 1, ... , 4, the fixed or random effects are a2 i = Yz 2a2' and 
, " , ,,1 
f.12 = Y2,2C2' This is the second structural equation of our dynamic system to be 
estimated. 
Equation 3: Implied Fuel Efficiency 
Because we now have equations for average vehicle fuel consumption per 
resident and average vehicle miles traveled per resident, we can derive an equation for 
the implied vehicle fuel efficiency measured in miles per gallon, mpgi t' By definition, it 
must be true that 
• 
• mit 
mpgi,t =-;-
gi,( 
(III-ll) 
in equilibrium. Taking the natural logarithm of (III-II) and substituting (III -7) for In m; t 
and (lII-3) for In g;,t' the long-run equilibrium of implied vehicle fuel efficiency is 
(III-12) 
where c3 . = c2 . - c, .; a3 . = a2 . - a, .; bo k = b2 k - b, k for k = 1, ... , 4, a3,' = az " - n " and ,I ,I ,I ,1 ,1 ,1 _"l, , , " --"1, 
b3,k = b2,k -b"k for k = 1, ... ,4. 
To capture both long and short-run responses in fuel consumption and driving 
behavior, the fuel efficiency adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is assumed to take 
the following form. 
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(III-13) 
Taking the natural logarithm of (III-13) and rearranging terms yields 
(III-14) 
Recall, however, the dynamic equations of fuel consumption and vehicle miles traveled. 
Substituting (III-S) and (III-9) into the identity describing fuel efficiency, 
In mpgi t = In mi t -In gi t' then it is also true that , , , 
(III-IS) 
From (III-14) and (III-IS), it must be the case that Y3,l = 11,1 and Y3,2 = Y2,2 in our system 
of three equations. 
Notice the form of adjustment in (III-13) differs from the fuel demand adjustment 
in (III-4) and the vehicle miles traveled adjustment in (III-8) the demand for vehicle miles 
traveled. Specifically, lagged vehicle miles traveled and lagged fuel demand are included 
in the vehicle fuel efficiency equation rather than lagged fuel efficiency. This is to allow 
the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium to differ between fuel demand and 
vehicle miles traveled, i.e. the system does not require 11 I = Y22' If, however, Yi I = Y 2 2 ' 
then Y3,1 = Y3,2 ' and (III -14) reduces to 
(III-16) 
where Y3,1 = Y3,2 = Y3,3' Nonetheless, we allow the adjustment in each equation to vary 
and later test the restriction Y3,1 = Y 3,2 = Y3,3 • 
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Finally, substituting the dynamic equations for fuel consumption and vehicle 
travel in (III-6) and (III-lO), respectively, dynamic fuel efficiency can be described by the 
following equation. 
In mp g i,t = (112 - J.iJ ) + ( a2,i - au ) + (/32,1 - /31,1 ) In Pi,t + (/32,2 - /31,2 ) In si,t 
+ (/32,3 - /31,3 ) In Vi,t + (/32,4 - A,4 ) In di,t 
+ (1- Y3,2) In mi,t_1 - (1- Y3,I) In gi,t-I + U3,i,t 
(III-17) 
Letting f.l" = 112 - J.iJ ' a 3 i = a 2 i - al i and /3, k = /32 k - /31 k for k = 1, ... , 4, the third and 
- ", -, , , 
final equation that we wish to estimate is 
In mpgi,t = 113 + a3,i + /33,1 In Pi,t + /33,2 In Si,t + /33,3 In vi,t + /33,4 In di,t 
+ (1- Y3,2) In mi,t-I - (1- 'YJ,I) In gi,t-I + U3,i,t 
System of Equations Model 
(III-18) 
The system to be estimated is composed of three dynamic structural equations describing 
the demand for vehicle fuel, vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. From (III-6), 
(III-lO) and (III-18) the short-run system is 
In g i,t = J.iJ + al,i + /31,1 In Pi,t + A,2 In Si,t + /31,3 In Vi,t + A,4 In di,t 
+ ( 1- YJ,I ) In g i,l-I + UI,i,t 
In mi,t = 112 + a 2,i + /32,1 In Pi,t + /32,2 In Si,t + /32,3 In vi,t + /32,4 In di,t 
+ (1- Y2,2) In mi,t-I + U 2,i,t 
In mpg i,t = J13 + a 3,i + /33,1 In Pi,t + /33,2 In Si,t + /33,3 In Vi,t + /33,4 In di,t 
+ ( 1- Y3,2 ) In mi,t_1 - ( 1- Y3,I ) In g i,t-I + U3,i,t 
where several constraints follow from the identity In mpgi,t = In mi,t -In gi,t . 
(III-19) 
Constraint A: a2 · - a, . = a3 . Vi = 1, ... , N 
,1 ,1 ,I 
Constraint B: fiL. - J.4 = /13 
Constraint C: /32.k - /3l.k = /33.k Vk = 1, ... , 4 
Constraint D: Y jJ = Y3,j Vj = 1,2 
The parameter estimates of the long-run system of three equations 
In g;t = c, + ~,i + buln Pi,( + b,,2 In Si,t + b1,3 In Vi,t + b,,4 In di,t 
In m;,t = c2 + a 2,i + b 2" In P;,t + b2,2 1n Si,t + b 2,3 In vi,t + b2,4ln d;,t 
In mpg;t = c3 + a3,; + b 3" In Pi,( + b 3,2 In S;,t + b 3,3 In vi,t + b 3,4 In di,t 
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(111-20) 
(111-21) 
can be recovered from the estimation of the short-run system described by (111-19) and 
(111-20). In particular 
b],k = /3],k / ri,]' b 2,k = /32,k / Y2,2 and b 3,k = /32,k / Y3,2 - /3],k / 1'J,l Vk = 1, ... , 4. 
Decomposition of the Elasticities of Fuel Demand 
Using the parameter estimates of this system, fuel demand can be analyzed by 
component (demand for vehicle miles traveled and vehicle fuel efficiency) where 
(111-22) 
For example, consider any independent variable Xi,t in our model of fuel demand, The 
long-run elasticity of fuel demand per capita with respect to variable Xi t (denoted £;*), is 
equal to the elasticity of vehicle miles traveled (denoted £;*), minus the elasticity of fuel 
efficiency (denoted £;,pg'). Formally, 
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(111-23) 
where 
(111-24) 
and 
(111-25) 
Therefore the long-run elasticity of fuel demand with respect to variable Xi,! is 
positive if and only if e';* > e,;pg*. Similarly, elasticity of fuel demand is negative if and 
only if e';* < e,;pg·. Note the same holds in the short-run, where the short-run elasticity of 
fuel demand with respect to variable Xi,! (denoted e;), is equal to the elasticity of vehicle 
miles traveled (denoted e';), minus the elasticity of fuel efficiency (denoted e,;pg), i.e. 
cog = com _ compg 
c.. x "x c.. x . 
d. Data 
County-level data on motor gasoline and diesel consumption is made available by 
the Florida Energy and Climate Commission in its annual Florida Motor Gasoline and 
Diesel Fuel Report. The 2008 report contains monthly observations of motor gasoline 
sales "derived from local option gas tax receipts" beginning January 1989 through 
December 2008 for each of the 67 Florida counties.67 These sales records, measured in 
gallons, were checked for accuracy and are consistent with U.S. Energy Information 
67 The local option gas tax is assessed in $/gallon and published by county in the 2008 Florida Motor 
Gasoline and Diesel, Given the tax rate and county tax receipts, the calculation of gasoline sales measured 
in gallons is straightforward 
Administration (2009) State Energy Data System (SEDS) statistics on motor gasoline 
consumed annually by the transportation sector in the State of Florida. 68 
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Although annual diesel consumption measured in gallons is not available by 
calendar year at the county level, it is available by fiscal year (starting in July and ending 
in June). We analyzed monthly diesel fuel consumption at the state level and found first 
.,. 
half diesel fuel consumption does not vary statistically from second half consumption for 
our sample. Thus, we assume county-level diesel fuel consumption for the calendar year 
is the simple average of the two relevant fiscal years. Finally, because the heat content of 
diesel fuel is approximately 139,000 btu/gallon whereas the heat content of gasoline is 
approximately 125,000 btu/gallon, diesel consumption is converted to a gallon of 
gasoline equivalent, i.e. 1 gallon of diesel is equal to 1.12 gallons of gasoline 
equivalent.69 
Fuel demand in equation 1 is defined as the quantity of gasoline plus diesel 
consumed in each county measured in gallons of gasoline equivalent divided by the 
number of days per year and county population.7o The system of structural equations is 
estimated using annual observations from 2001 to 2008.71 
The Transportation Statistics Office at the Florida Department of Transportation 
collects and publishes an annual report on public roads. The report contains centerline 
miles (defined as the "length of road, without regard to the number of lanes") and daily 
vehicle miles traveled (defined as the "the product of a road's centerline miles and its 
68 The Energy Information Administration's SEDS contains state-level data only. 
69 While consumption data by fuel type is available, data on vehicle miles traveled is only provided at the 
aggregate level. Otherwise, one would be able to develop separate models of gasoline and diesel fuel 
demand. 
70 County population is available from the U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division (2009). 
71 The model is restricted to yearly observations from 2001 to 2008 due data limitations for several of the 
independent variables. 
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annual average daily traffic"). In equation 2, vehicle miles traveled is defined as daily 
vehicle miles traveled by county divided by county population. 
In equation 3, county-level implied vehicle fuel efficiency is measured in miles 
per gallon and is computed by simply dividing the time series of vehicle miles traveled 
by the quantity of fuel sold, measured in gallons of gasoline equivalent. Recall that in 
equations 1 and 2, the dependent variables - fuel demand and vehicle miles traveled, 
respectively - contain annual observations of the average daily value per capita for each 
of the 67 Florida counties from 2001 to 2008. Therefore the units cancel, leaving a panel 
series of implied vehicle fuel efficiency.72 
We compute a unique gasoline price series for each county assuming between-
county variation results only from differing county tax rates. The average tax-inclusive 
price of gasoline in Florida is derived from the monthly PADD1c average price of "all 
grades all formulations" of retail gasoline, state tax rates and gasoline sales published by 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration.73 Using Florida county tax rate history and 
gasoline sales statistics published by the Florida Energy and Climate Commission (2009), 
we construct a time series of the Florida's average county tax rate weighted by volume. 
The monthly county-level gasoline price is then computed as the Florida average monthly 
tax-inclusive price minus the state's average county tax rate plus the individual county 
tax rate. Instead of taking the simple average of the price of gasoline in each month, we 
weight the price in each month by the quantity of gasoline consumed to yield the average 
annual gasoline price. 
72 Whereas vehicle miles traveled are appropriately measured by county, fuel consumption measured by 
county sales records report consumption at the point of purchase rather than point of combustion. Thus 
implied fuel efficiency may be biased by out-of-county fuel purchases, particularly for commuters. 
73 PADDle is composed of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. 
103 
The same procedure is performed to construct the average annual diesel price 
from the monthly PADDlc report of "No 2 diesel retail sales by all sellers" published by 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009). The quantity of gasoline and diesel 
measured in gallons of gasoline equivalent are used to compute the weighted average fuel 
price for each county. Finally, this nominal fuel price series by county is deflated by the 
consumer price index for all urban consumers, all items obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009). 
The measure of economic activity in our model is real gross sales of goods and 
services per resident. Data was compiled from the Florida Department of Revenue 
annual or semiannual reports to construct a single times-series of nominal gross sales by 
county. This data series was then divided by county population and deflated by the U.S. 
consumer price index for all urban consumers to yield the real gross sale of goods and 
. 'd' h 7475 servIces per resI ent III eac county. ' 
County-level average motor vehicle ownership is calculated by dividing motor 
vehicle registrations by county population. Statistics on total motor vehicle registrations 
by county were collected from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles, The data series "does not include mobile homes, trailers, vessels, dealer or 
74 The consumer price index for all urban consumers, all items is available from the U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
75 Recall county gasoline and diesel fuel consumption were derived from county tax receipts. Because off-
road vehicles used for farming, for example, are generally exempt from fuel taxes, our consumption data 
represents only on-road fuel demand. Similarly, vehicle miles traveled includes only public roads and our 
vehicle registration data is a proxy for the number on-road vehicles by county. Thus, or system of 
equations models on-road vehicle fuel demand, on-road vehicle miles traveled and implied on-road fuel 
efficiency in only the transportation sector. 
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transporter license plates, half-year truck/tractor registrations or permanent government 
license plates" and therefore is a reasonable proxy for on-road vehicles.76 
Population density is calculated by dividing total county population by the county 
land area, measured in square miles. County population statistics were collected from the 
u.s. Census Bureau, Population Division (2009). The 2008 Florida Motor Gasoline and 
Diesel Fuel Report contains land area statistics published by the Florida Statistical 
Abstract 2007. 
e. Estimation Procedure 
Recall the system of equations in (111-19) describing the dynamic models of 
vehicle fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. 
Equation 1: 
In g i,t = f.1t + ~,i + A,1In Pi,t + A,2 In Si,t + Pl,3 In Vi,t + Pl,4 In di,t 
+(l-Yi,I)Ingi,t_1 +Ul,i,t 
Equation 2: 
In mi,t = ~ + a 2,i + P2,1ln Pi,t + P2,2 In Si,t + P2,3 In Vi,t + P2,4 ln di,t 
+ (1- Y2,2 ) In mi,t-l + U2,i,t 
Equation 3: 
In mpg i,t = I1J + a 3,i + P3,l In pi,( + P3,2 In Si,t + P3,3 In Vi,t + P3,4ln di,t 
+ (1- Y3,2) In mi,t-l - (1- Y3,1) In gi,t-l + U3,i,t 
Before applying the constraints described in (111-20), the three models are estimated 
independently to test the specification of each model. 
76 Vehicle registration data is only available by fiscal year (starting in July and ending in June). We label 
the year the calendar year ending the fiscal year. For example, the fiscal year 2007-2008 corresponds with 
the year 2008 in our dataset. 
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Endogenous Regressors 
The estimation of these three equations is complicated by the dynamic 
specification.77 In particular, the lagged dependent variables are correlated with the 
county-specific effects causing the parameter estimates to be inconsistent. In Model 3, 
for example, implied fuel efficiency (In mpgi I) is a function of the county-specific effect 
(a3,i) by construction where Constraint A in (111-20) requires a 3,i = a 2,i - ~,i .78 Thus, 
implied fuel efficiency is also a function of the county-specific effects in equations 1 and 
2 (~i and a2 i' respectively). Since the lagged dependent variables of equation 1 , , 
( In gil-I) and equation 2 (In mi I-I ) are also a function of the respective county-specific , , 
effect in each equation, the set of regressors in equation 3 is correlated with its combined 
residual (a2,i - al,i + U3,i,I)' Therefore, standard OLS-based fixed or random effects 
estimation of equation 3 will yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. The 
same is true for equations 1 and 2. 
To test the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variables (In gi I-I and In mi I-I) , , 
each model is estimated independently using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The 
county-specific effects are assumed to be fixed.79 In addition, the instruments for the 
lagged dependent variables are the current and lagged values of the regressors and are 
77 For a thorough discussion of panel data estimation see Baltagi (2008). For dynamic panel data 
estimation, see Greene (2003), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Abn and Schmidt (1995) for example. 
78 The null hypothesis that a3•i = a2 •i - al •i cannot be rejected in the unconstrained 2SLS-within estimation 
of the three equations. The results are presented in Table 111-6. 
79 Below it is shown that the 2SLS-GLS estimator is rejected in favor of the 2SLS-within estimator in the 
unconstrained estimation procedure, suggesting the fixed effects specification is warranted. The results are 
presented in Table III-4. 
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identical in the estimation of each of the three models: In Pi,t' In Pi,t-I' In Si,t' In Si,t_1 ' 
In Vi,t' In Vi,t-I' In di,t' In di,t-l ,In gi,t-2 and In m i,t-2 • 
A Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is performed on the combined results of the 
three equations. so The DWH test is a Hausman-type test comparing the 2SLS-within 
parameter estimates to those of the OLS-within estimator. The covariance matrices for 
both 2SLS-within and the OLS-within estimator are based on the estimated error 
variances of the OLS-within estimator. The null hypothesis is that the OLS-within 
estimator of the equation is consistent. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the 
regressor (or set of regressors) being tested is correlated with the combined residual and 
should be treated as endogenous. 
In the three equations of fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel 
efficiency, the lagged dependent variables ( In g i,t-I and In mi,t-l ) appear a total of four 
times. Thus, the DWH test statistic is distributed as .%2(4) with a critical value of 9.45 at 
the 5% level and 13.28 at the 1 % level. The DWH test statistic for the exogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variables is 11.42, suggesting In gi,t-I and In mi,t-I are jointly correlated 
with the three combined error terms, al,i + U1,i,t ' a2,i + U 2,i,t and a3,i + U 3,i,t at the 5% 
significance level. Therefore, the lagged dependent variables are treated as endogenous 
in the remainder of this paper. Nonetheless, the exogeneity of the remaining regressors is 
not assumed. 
80 Each equation is estimated independently without the system constraints; however, the DWH test is 
performed on the joint estimation results. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the lagged dependent 
variable is jointly endogenous in the system of fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel 
efficiency. 
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Table 111-2: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the exogeneity of regressors 
Specification: A B C D E 
Regressor(s): In mi,t_l' In gU-l In Pi,t Ins i,t Inv i,t lnd i,t 
Distribution: 1'2 (4) X' (3) X' (3) X' (3) X' (3) 
CV5% 9.45 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81 
CVl% 13.28 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 
Eq. 1-3, jointly 11.42** 13.40*** 0.88 4.49 7.56 
The null hypothesis is that parameter estimates are consistent. Rejection implies the regressor is 
endogenous in the three models of fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
If Florida residents are strictly price-takers in the market for vehicle fuel, the 
assumption of price exogeneity would be warranted. However, a DWH test reveals the 
assumption yields inconsistent parameter estimates. In particular, in Specification B of 
Table III-2, price (In Pi t) is removed from the set of exogenous regressors and added to 
the set of endogenous regressors which now becomes In gi,t-I' In mi,t-I and In Pi,t. 2SLS-
within is performed instrumenting for the three endogenous variables where appropriate 
in each model. The DWH test compares the parameter estimates of Specifications A and 
B. The test statistic, distributed as Z2(3) , is 13.40 and the 1 % critical value is 11.34. 
Thus, the parameter estimates of Specification A are rejected as inconsistent in favor of 
Specification B. From here forward, the price of vehicle fuel is assumed to be correlated 
with the composed error terms and treated as endogenous in our system of vehicle fuel 
demand, vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. 81 
81 This result may follow from the construction of the price series used in the system of equations model of 
vehicle fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel efficiency. In particular, county-level prices 
are qot available and we computed individual county-level price data assuming between county variation 
results only from differing county tax rates. However, it may be true that transportation costs vary by 
county or that fuel prices (pre and post-tax) may be correlated with tourism, causing some counties to have 
consistently higher fuel prices than others, In this example, high tourism and high tax rates would cause 
vehicle fuel prices to be correlated with the individual effect. 
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In Specification C, county-level sales of goods and services (In Si,l) is removed 
from the set of exogenous regressors and added to the set of endogenous regressors which 
now becomes In gi,I-I' In mi,I_I' In Pi,t and In Si,l. 2SLS-within is performed instrumenting 
for the four endogenous variables. The DWH test compares the parameter estimates of 
Specifications Band C. The test statistic, distributed as X 2 (3) , is 0.88, which does not 
exceed the critical value of 7.81 at the 5% level. Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, and county-level sales per capita is assumed to be exogenous. 
Next, the endogeneity of vehicle ownership is tested. In Specification D, the 
share of vehicle ownership (In vi,l) is added to the set of endogenous regressors which 
becomes In gi t-l' In m i I-I' In Pi I and In Vi I. 2SLS-within is performed instrumenting for , , , , 
the four endogenous variables. The DWH test is performed comparing the parameter 
estimates of Specifications Band D. The test statistic, distributed as X\3), is 4.49, 
which does not exceed the critical value of 7.81 at the 5% level. The null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, and the share of vehicle ownership is assumed to be exogenous to our 
system of vehicle fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. 
In Specification E, population density ( In di I ) is removed from the set of 
exogenous regressors and added to the set of endogenous regressors which now becomes 
In gi,I-I' In mi,I_I' In Pi,1 and In di,t . 2SLS-within is performed instrumenting for the four 
endogenous variables. The DWH test is performed comparing the parameter estimates of 
Specifications Band E. The test statistic, distributed as X2 (3) , is 7.56, which does not 
exceed the critical value of 7.81 at the 5% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, and population is assumed to be exogenous to our system of vehicle fuel 
demand, vehicle miles traveled and fuel efficiency. 
County-Specific Effects 
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It remains to test the significance and nature of the county-specific effects in the 
individual equations for vehicle fuel demand, vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel 
efficiency. In the analysis that follows, we use 2SLS panel estimators where we 
instrument price (In Pi,( ), lagged fuel demand (In gi,t-l) and lagged vehicle miles traveled 
(In mi,t-l ) with the current and lagged values of the regressors: In Si,t' In Si,t-l' In Vi,t ' 
In Vi,t-l' In di,t' In di,t-l, In Pi,t-l' In gi,t-2 and In m i,t-2 • 
First, we test the hypothesis that the county-specific effects are significant. The 
umestricted model is the 2SLS-within estimator allowing for only county-specific 
heterogeneity in the intercept where the slopes are assumed to be common. The 
restricted model is the pooled-2SLS model with a common intercept and common slopes. 
There are N -1 restrictions and N (T -1) - K degrees of freedom in each of the three 
equations. Wooldridge (1990), however, points out that the distribution of the F-statistic 
for the 2SLS estimator is unknown, even asymptotically. Thus, inferences made from the 
standard F-statistic can be misleading. Instead, Wooldridge suggests using the sum of 
squared residuals from the second-stage regression for both the restricted and unrestricted 
estimations in the numerator. The denominator remains the residuals from the 2SLS 
estimation. 
The results of the test of the significance of the county-specific effects are 
presented in Table III-3. The 2SLS F-statistics of equations 1 and 2 are distributed as 
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F(66,464) with a critical value of 1.33 at the 5% level and 1.50 at the 1 % level. Due to 
the presence of an additional lagged dependent variable in the model of implied fuel 
efficiency, the equation 3 statistic is distributed as F(66,463) with critical values of 1.33 
and 1.50 at the 5% and 1 % levels, respectively.82 The null hypothesis that the county-
specific effects are jointly equal to zero is rejected in equation 1 at the 5% significance 
level with an F-statistic equal to 1.40. The null hypothesis is easily rejected at the 1 % 
level in the individual estimates of equations 2 and 3 with F-statistics of 6.48 and 6.43, 
respectively. Also, a test of the null hypothesis that the county-specific effects are jointly 
equal to zero in all three equations is rejected at the 1 % level. The F-statistic, distributed 
as F(198,1391), is equal to 4.77 which exceeds the critical value of 1.27 at the 1 % level. 
Table 111-3: F-test for the significance of effects, unconstrained 2SLS-within 
Equation: Null Hypotheses: Distribution: 
Eq. 1: In gi,/ al,i = 0 Vi = 1, ... ,N F(66,464) 
Eq. 2: In mi,/ a", = 0 Vi = 1, ... ,N F(66,464) 
Eq. 3: In = 0 Vi = 1, .. "N F(66,462) 
Eq. 1-3, jointly a = 0 Vj = 1,2,3 Vi = 1, ... , N 
j,' 
F(198,1391) 
Under the null hypothesis, the county-specific effects are insignificant. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
CV5%: CV1%: 
1.33 1.50 
1.33 1.50 
1.33 1.50 
1.19 1.27 
F-stat: 
1.40** 
6.48*** 
6.43*** 
4.77*** 
Finally, we test whether the county-specific effects are to be treated as fixed or 
random. The fixed effects estimator allows the effect to be correlated with the regressors 
and is always unbiased and consistent. However, if the unobserved county effects are 
strictly uncorrelated with the regressors, the random effects estimator is consistent and 
efficient since there are fewer parameters to estimate. Thus, we perform a Hausman test 
to compare the estimated coefficients. Under the null hypothesis, the effects are 
82 The critical values of the F-test of the significance of the county-specific effects in Model 3 are equal to 
those of Models 1 and 2 due to rounding. 
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uncorrelated with the regressors. Therefore, there will be no systematic difference 
between the fixed and random effects parameter estimates since each will converge to its 
true value. 
In this Hausman test, 2SLS-within is the consistent estimator while 2SLS-GLS is 
the efficient estimator (and consistent under the null hypothesis). The test is distributed 
as X 2 (5) in equations 1 and 2 with a critical value of 15.09 at the 1 %. In equation 3 the 
test is distributed as X2(6) with a critical value of 16.81 at the 1 %. The results are 
presented in Table IlI-4. The 2SLS-GLS estimator is easily rejected at the 1 % level in 
each of the three equations individually. The test statistics are equal to 39.42, 372.64, 
388.80 in equations 1,2 and 3, respectively. 
Table 111-4: Hausman test for random effects 
Equation: Distribution: CV5%: CVl%: 
Eq. 1: In gi,t 2'2(5) 1l.07 15.09 
Eq. 2: In m", 2'2(5) 11.07 15,09 
Eq. 3: In 2'2(6) 12,59 16.81 
Eq. 1-3, jointly 2'2(16) 26.30 32.00 
Under the null hypothesis the 2SLS-GLS estimator is consistent. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
Test stat: 
39.42*** 
372.64*** 
3.88.80*** 
841.74*** 
Moreover, a Hausman test of the three equations estimated jointly is performed. 
The test statistic is distributed as X2(16) with a 1 % critical value of 32.00. With a test 
statistic of 841.74, the 2SLS-GLS estimator is easily rejected in favor of the 2SLS-within 
estimator of the three jointly estimated system of equations for fuel demand, vehicle 
miles traveled and implied fuel efficiency. For the remainder of this paper, the effects are 
assumed to be significant, correlated with the regressors and are treated as fixed. 
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Table 111-5: Unconstrained 2SLS-within parameter estimates 
Eq. 1: In gi,t Eq. 2: In mi,t Eq.3: lnmpgit 
Estimated short-run coefficients 
0.2791 3.3661 *** 3.3659*** 
f..l j (0.2048) (0.) (0.2978) 
fij,l In Pi,t -0.0385*** -0.0021 0.0416** (0.0114) (0.0127) (0.0164) 
fij ,2 In si,t 0.0483*** 0.0650*** 0.0128 (0.0143) (0.0151) (0.0190) 
P3 lnv 
0.0701 *** -0.0389 -0.0822** 
j, l,t (0.0262) (0.0286) (0.0352) 
Pj ,4lndi.t -0.0938* -0.3199*** -0.1792** (0.0542) (0.0563) (0.0716) 
(1- rj,l ) In gi,t-l 0.7021*** 0.4801 *** (0.0607) (0.0807) 
(1- r j ,2) In mi,t-l 0,3486*** 0.2160*** (0.0348) (0.0429) 
Implied long-run coefficients 
cj 0.9369 5.1676*** 
bj,lln Pi,t -0.1293** -0.0032 
bj,2 In Si,t 0.1620*** 0.0998*** 
bj,3 ln Vi,t 0.2354** -0.0597 
bj,4lnd;.t -0.3149* -0.4911 *** 
Within R2 0.4703 0.3639 0.3004 
Overall R2 0.8573 0.6733 0.5129 
The subscript-j in the parameter notation refers to the model number. The long-run 
coefficients can not be recovered from the unconstrained 2SLS estimation of Model 3. 
*, **, *** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 10%,5% or 1% level, respectively. 
Unconstrained Parameter Estimates 
The unconstrained 2SLS-within parameter estimates of equations 1,2 and 3 are 
presented in. The short-run parameter estimates (see (III-19» are presented along with 
the standard errors, which are reported in parentheses. The implied long run coefficient 
estimates (see (III-21» are presented together with the within equation and overall R2. 
In general, all short and long-run parameter estimates significantly different from zero 
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have the appropriate sign. In equation 1 describing fuel consumption, the short (and 
therefore long-run) coefficient on the price of fuel is negative and significant while the 
short (and long-run) coefficients on county-level sales, vehicle ownership and lagged fuel 
consumption are positive and significant. However, the short (and long-run) coefficient 
on density is significant at only the 10% level, but the negative sign is consistent with a 
review of the literature which suggests fuel consumption decreases with increasing 
density. 
In equation 2 describing vehicle miles traveled, the short (and long-run) 
coefficients on the price of fuel and vehicle ownership are insignificant while the 
parameter estimates of county-level sales and lagged vehicle miles traveled are positive 
and significant. Finally, the coefficient on density is negative and significant. 
In equation 3 describing implied vehicle fuel efficiency, the short-run coefficient 
estimate on county-level sales is insignificant. However, the short-run coefficients on 
price, lagged fuel consumption and lagged vehicle miles traveled are significant and 
positive, while for vehicle ownership and population density the coefficients are negative 
and significant. 
Without Constraints Band C (see (111-20)), it cannot be guaranteed that 
b3,k = b2,k - b1,k. Therefore, the long-run parameter estimates (b3,k for all k = 1, ... , 4) in 
equation 3 cannot be recovered. In particular, b3,k = fl2,k / Y3,2 - fl1,k / Y3,1 for all k = 1, ... ,4. 
While the single-equation estimation procedure does provide parameter estimates of Y3,1 
and Y3,2' it does not provide estimates of A.,k or fl2,k. Thus, the long-run parameter 
estimates of equation 3 are not reported in 
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Table III-5. 
The unconstrained 2SLS-within parameter estimates reported in 
Table III-5 are used to test the 73 constraints described in (III-20). The results are 
presented in Table III-6. Constraint A is a set of 66 restrictions on the county-specific 
effects such that a 2,i - al,i = a 3,i for each i = 1, ... , 66. A single test of these restrictions is 
distributed as F(67,1391). The critical value is equal to 1.31 at the 5% level. With an F-
statistic of 0.14, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore Constraint A is 
satisfied in the unconstrained 2SLS-within estimation procedure. 
Table 111-6: F -test of system constraints 
Null Hypothesis: Distribution: CV 5 %: CV 1 % : F-stat: 
Constraint A 
aZ,i -~,i = a3,i Vi = 1, ... ,N-l F(66,1391) 1.31 1.46 0.14 
Constraint B 
112 - f.4 = f13 F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 0.41 
Constraint C 
In Pi,t: /32,1 - /31,l = /33,1 F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 0.05 
In Si,t: /32,2 - /31,2 = /33,2 F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 0.02 
In Vi,t: /32,3 - /31,3 = /33,3 F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 0.26 
In di,t: /32,4 - /31,4 = /33,4 F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 0.20 
Constraint D 
In g i,t-I: Yl,l = 1'3,1 F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 5.76** 
In F(I,1391) 3.85 6.65 4.83** 
Constraints A, B, C and D jointly F(73,1391) 1.30 1.44 0.14 
Under the null hypothesis each constraint is satisfied. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
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Constraint B requires 112 - f.1t = 11J. The test of this restriction is distributed as 
F(1,1391) with a critical value of 1.31 at the 5%. The F-statistic is equal to 0.41; 
therefore, the null hypothesis that 112 - f.1t = I1J cannot be rejected. 
Constraint C is composed of four separate restrictions on the contemporaneous 
regressors. Specifically, P2k - PI k = P3 k for k = 1, ... ,4. The four tests are each 
, , , 
distributed as F(1,1391) with a 5% critical value equal to 3.85. The F-statistics are 0.05, 
0.02,0.26 and 0.20, respectively, for price, county-level sales, vehicle ownership and 
density. Thus Constraint C cannot be rejected in the unconstrained 2SLS-within 
estimation procedure. 
Constraint D requires the dynamic adjustment of vehicle fuel demand to be equal 
in the models of vehicle fuel demand and implied fuel efficiency, i.e. /),1 = Y3,1 • 
Similarly, the dynamic adjustment of vehicle miles traveled must be equal in the models 
of vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel efficiency, i.e. Y2,2 = Y3,2' Each of these 
constraints has one restriction. Thus the two F-tests are each distributed as F(1,1390) 
with a critical value of 3.85 at the 5% level and 6.65 at the 1 % level. The F-statistics are 
5.76 and 4.83 for dynamic adjustments of vehicle fuel consumption and vehicle miles 
traveled, respectively. Therefore, the unconstrained 2SLS-within estimation procedure 
does not satisfy Constraint D at the 5 % level. 
Finally, a test is performed on the null hypothesis that all 73 constraints described 
by A, B, C and D are jointly met. The F-statistic, distributed as F(73,1390), is equal to 
0.14, which does not exceed even the 5% critical value of 1.30. The null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, and it is assumed that the unconstrained 2SLS-within estimation 
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procedure satisfies the constraints of the system of vehicle fuel demand, vehicle miles 
traveled and implied fuel efficiency. 
Constrained 2SLS Parameter Estimates 
In order to recover the long-run parameter estimates of equation 3, the system of 
equations described in (111-19) is estimated via 2SLS-within including the 73 constraints 
defined in (111-20). F-tests confirm the county-specific effects remain significantly 
different than zero in the constrained 2SLS-within estimation procedure. The results are 
presented in Table 111-7. 
Table III-7: F-test for the significance of effects, constrained 2SLS-within 
Equation: Null Hypotheses: Distribution: 
Eq. 1: In g;,l a,,; = 0 Vi = 1, ... ,N F(66,1391) 
Eq. 2: In m;,l a 2 ,; = 0 Vi = 1, ... ,N F(66,1391) 
Eq. 3: In = 0 Vi = 1, ... ,N F(66,1391) 
Eq. 1-3, jointly a . = 0 Vj = 1,2,3 Vi = 1, ... , N F(l32,1391) j.' 
Under the null hypothesis the county-specific effects are insignificant. 
** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 1 % level. 
CV5%: CVl%: 
1.31 1.46 
1.31 1.46 
1.31 1.46 
1.22 1.32 
F-stat: 
2.25*** 
11.68*** 
12.33*** 
7.15*** 
In equations 1,2 and 3, the test is distributed as F(66,1391) with critical values 
equal to 1.31 and 1.46 at the 5% and 1 % significance levels, respectively. The F-
statistics are equal to 2.25, 11.68 and 12.33 respectively in equations 1,2 and 3. The 
individual tests that the county-specific effects are jointly equal to zero in each of the 
three equations therefore is rejected. Due to the constraint that a 2,i - al,i = a 3,; for all 
Vi = 1, ... , N -1, the test on the system of equations has only 132 restrictions. Thus the F-
statistic is distributed as F(132,1391) with critical values equal to 1.22 and 1.32 at the 
5% and 1 % significance levels, respectively. The F-statistic is equal to 7.15, and the null 
hypothesis that the county-specific effects are jointly equal to zero in the system of all 
three equations is easily rejected. 
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The short-run parameter estimates are presented in Table III-S along with the 
standard errors, reported in parentheses. The implied long-run parameter estimates are 
presented at the bottom of the table. 
In general, all short and long-run parameter estimates significantly different than 
zero have the appropriate sign. Moreover, the constrained results are quite similar to the 
unconstrained estimation results, although several parameter estimates are more 
significant. For example, the short and long-run coefficients on population density in 
equation 1 are significant at the 10% level in the unconstrained case and at the 5% level 
in the constrained case. The short-run coefficients on price, vehicle ownership and 
density also become more significant in the model of fuel efficiency in equation 3. 
In equation 1, J'I,! = 0.3731 implies roughly 37% of the total adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium demand for vehicle fuel occurs in the first year. In contrast, 
Y2,2 = 0.7006 implies roughly 70% of the total adjustment to the long-run equilibrium 
demand for vehicle miles traveled occurs in the first year. An F-test of the restriction that 
J'I,! = Y2,2 is distributed as F(l,139I). With an F-statistic equal to 35.S, the hypothesis 
that the rate of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium demand for fuel is equal to the rate 
of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium demand for vehicle miles traveled is rejected. 
Thus, the equation for fuel efficiency implied by (lII-I6) is rejected in favor of the model 
implied by (III-IS). Moreover, the results suggest that the demand for vehicle miles 
traveled responds more quickly to contemporaneous factors than the demand for vehicle 
fuel. 
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Table 111-8: Constrained 2SLS-within parameter estimates 
Eq. 1: In gi,t Eq. 2: In mi,t Eq.3: lnmpgit 
Estimated short-run coefficients 
03202* 3.5145*** 3.1943*** f1 j (0.1773) (0.1992) (0.2159) 
Pj,lln Pi,t -0.0327*** 0.0061 0.0389*** (0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0118) 
Pj,2 ln Si,t 0.0524*** 0.0681 *** 0.0157 (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0140) 
flj ,3 In vi•1 0.0676*** -0.0317 -0.0993*** (0.0227) (0.0238) (0.0260) 
flj,4lndi,t -0.1123** -0,3227*** -0.2104*** (0.0468) (0.0470) (0.0526) 
(1- Yj,l) In gi,t-l 0.6269*** 0.6263*** (0.0488) (0.0489) 
(1- Yj,2) In mi,t-l 0.2994*** 0.2994*** (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Implied long-run coefficients 
mj 0.8581 5.0163*** 4.1581 *** 
bj,llnpi,t -0.0877*** 0.0088 0.0965*** 
bj,2 In Si,t 0.1405*** 0.0972*** -0.0433 
bj,3 ln vi,1 0.1812*** -0.0452 -0.2264*** 
bj,4lndi ,1 -0.3009** -0.4605*** -0.1596 
The subscript-j in the parameter notation refers to the model number. 
*, **, *** Denotes the statistic is significant at the 10%, 5% or 1 % level, respectively. 
Finally, we are able to separate the elasticity estimates of vehicle fuel demand into 
elasticity estimates of vehicle miles traveled and implied fuel efficiency. First, in the 
short-run (and long-run) the parameter estimate on the price of vehicle fuel (In Pi,t) is not 
significant in the equation for vehicle miles traveled, but it is positive and significant in 
the model of implied fuel efficiency. This evidence suggest that in the short-run drivers 
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attempt to optimize engine performance by choosing less congested routes, performing 
routine maintenance or simply by driving at a lower speed at the cost of added time 
expense, rather than reducing overall vehicle miles traveled by carpooling or taking 
public transportation for example. 
The long-run price elasticity of fuel demand is significant and equal to -0.0877, 
which can be disaggregated into the long-run price elasticity of vehicle miles traveled, 
0.0088, and the long-run price elasticity of vehicle fuel efficiency, 0.0965. This is 
consistent with our findings in the short-run. However, roughly 60% of the improvement 
in vehicle fuel efficiency caused by increasing fuel prices occurs after the first year. This 
suggests that Florida drivers also respond to changes in price by improving the capital 
stock of vehicles. In other words, rising prices likely resulted in Florida residents 
purchasing more fuel efficient vehicles. 
The impact of gross sales on vehicle fuel consumption, on the other hand, is 
dominated by a change in vehicle miles traveled rather than fuel efficiency. Specifically, 
the long-run elasticity of vehicle demand with respect to the sales of goods and services 
is significant and equal to 0.1405, which is composed of an elasticity of 0.0972 for 
vehicle miles traveled versus -0.0433 for vehicle fuel efficiency. This implies that an 
increase in economic activity results in an increase in vehicle miles traveled. Although 
the long-run coefficient on the sale of goods and services is not significant in the model 
of vehicle fuel efficiency in equation 3, the point estimate is negative. A loss of fuel 
efficiency might occur if increasing driving activity to acquire more goods causes 
reduced engine performance to do more frequent stops or added roadway congestions. 
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The long-run elasticity of vehicle fuel demand with respect to vehicle ownership 
is significant and equal to 0.1812, which is composed of an elasticity -0.0452 for vehicle 
miles traveled versus -0.2264 for vehicle fuel efficiency. Although one would anticipate 
the elasticity on vehicle miles traveled to be positive - implying that an increase in 
vehicle ownership leads to an increase in vehicle miles traveled - the statistic is not 
significantly greater than zero in our model. The result likely follows from the fact that 
vehicle ownership rates in Florida are already high. Specifically, there were 0.89 
vehicles per Florida resident in 2008. However, the elasticity estimate of -0.2264 for 
vehicle fuel efficiency may indicate an increase in the share of residents owning vehicles 
leads to road congestion and poorer engine performance. 
The short-run elasticity estimate of vehicle fuel demand with respect to density is 
significant and equal to -0.1123. This is consistent with both theoretical and empirical 
research which suggests that vehicle fuel demand and population density are negatively 
correlated. Given our system of equations, we are also able to decompose the impact of 
population density on vehicle fuel demand into the impact on vehicle miles traveled and 
vehicle fuel demand. In particular, the short-run elasticity estimate of vehicle miles 
traveled with respect to density is significant and equal to -0.3227, confirming vehicle 
miles traveled and population density are negatively correlated in the short-run in our 
sample. However, we find the short-run elasticity estimate of vehicle fuel efficiency 
with respect to population density to also be significant and equal to -0.2104. Thus, in 
the short-run an increase in population density decreases vehicle miles traveled and fuel 
demand, but a decrease in fuel efficiency -likely a result of increasing congestion-
offsets 65% of the total vehicle fuel savings generated by driving few miles. 
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In the long-run, however, the elasticity estimates of fuel demand with respect to 
population density are not significant in every model. In particular, the long-run 
elasticity estimates of fuel demand and vehicle miles traveled with respect to population 
density are significant and equal to -0.3009 and -0.4605, respectively. This is consistent 
with the short-run results suggesting both fuel demand and vehicle miles traveled are 
negatively correlated with population density. However, the elasticity estimate of vehicle 
fuel efficiency is not significant, although it is negative and equal to -0.1596. Thus, in 
the long run as population increases, a decrease in fuel efficiency offsets about 35% of 
the fuel demand lost as vehicle miles traveled falls. This suggests that the impact of 
density on fuel efficiency (and therefore fuel demand) is muted in the long-run relative to 
the short-run. One explanation for this might be that poor engine performance is 
minimized in the long-run by infrastructure improvements designed to eliminate 
congestion. 
f. Conclusions 
In this paper, we developed a system of equations to model motor vehicle fuel 
consumption per resident, vehicle miles traveled per resident and implied vehicle fuel 
efficiency in the 67 counties in the State of Florida. With this system of equations we 
decomposed fuel demand elasticity estimates into elasticities of demand for vehicle miles 
traveled and motor vehicle fuel efficiency, and analyzed the way various factors 
influence fuel demand. 
Particular attention is paid to the effects of vehicle fuel price, the gross sale of 
goods and services, vehicle ownership and population density on vehicle fuel demand, 
vehicle miles traveled and vehicle fuel efficiency. In summary, we find that an increase 
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in the price of fuel results in a short and long-run decrease in fuel demand but not through 
a decrease in vehicle miles traveled. Instead we find evidence that a price increase leads 
to an increase in fuel efficiency. We also find that the value of goods sold is positively 
correlated with vehicle fuel demand as consumers likely increase vehicle miles traveled 
to acquire more goods. However, this has no significant impact on vehicle fuel 
efficiency. In addition, we find that an increase in the share of vehicle ownership does 
not result in an increase in vehicle miles traveled in our sample. Alternatively, a decrease 
in vehicle fuel efficiency causes vehicle fuel demand to increase. Finally, an increase in 
population density decreases vehicle miles traveled but the vehicle fuel savings is offset 
by 65% in the short-run, and 35% in the long-run, by a loss of fuel efficiency. 
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